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This paper uses micro data on households to analyze how concern for the soundness
of private financial institutions and low interest rates change cash and deposits
demand. This paper uses individual household data from the 2001–03 Public
Opinion Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities (hereafter, the POS).
The POS asks questions regarding the amount of household financial assets and 
liabilities, selection of financial products, income and expenditures, perception of the
financial environment, life in old age, and household characteristics (such as number
of household members, age of the head of the household, and employment condi-
tions of family members). Because the sample changes each year, the POS data are
not a panel dataset. However, the POS has utilized the same sampling method over
many years. During the period analyzed in this paper, the survey collected responses
from more than 4,000 out of the 6,000 household samples each year.
The survey includes several unique qualitative questions regarding changes in
behavior under low interest rates and changes in behavior to increase the safety of
assets held. Thanks to those unique qualitative questions, we can analyze the extent
to which concern for the soundness of private financial institutions and low interest
rates influence households’ selections of financial products conditional on their 
characteristics (such as assets outstanding, income, age, and geographical region) 
and degrees of risk aversion. Another unique feature of the survey data is that
they cover the cash outstanding held by the households. The data on cash outstand-
ing help us to verify (or refute) popular public perceptions such as “the amount of 
household sector ‘mattress savings’ (funds held at homes in cash) has been rising in
recent years.” 
The motivation behind our study is the decline in the credit multiplier that was
observed during the latter half of the 1990s. Some (such as Iida, Harada, and Hamada
[2003]) attribute this decline to an increasing household-sector preference toward
cash holdings that was prompted by the low interest rate policy and the failures of
private-sector financial institutions. Others (such as Kobayashi [2003]) find that in
the corporate sector as well uncertainty regarding short-term funding and stock price
fluctuations and other concerns for the soundness of private financial institutions,
combined with the low interest rate policy, boosted the cash-deposits ratio and
reserves-deposit ratio, and thus led to a lower credit multiplier.
These analyses using macro data have three limitations. First, it is not possible 
to determine the amount of household cash holdings from the Japanese macro data.
Second, with the macro data it is not possible to determine whether and to what
extent there was a shift in asset demand along the extensive margin: for example, 
did households that previously held only bank deposits shift funds into postal 
savings, in response to intensifying concerns for the soundness of private financial
institutions? Third, while such shifts in household assets should vary depending 
on individual household characteristics, with the macro data we cannot take into
account such heterogeneity.
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POS. In examining the factors that cause fluctuations in cash and deposits demand, 
the data not only facilitate analyses of the intensive margin (how much households
increase or decrease the amounts of their financial products holdings in reaction to 
a given change), but also empirically demonstrate the importance of analyzing the
extensive margin (changes in the selection of financial products itself, such as the
choice to purchase a financial product that the household had not held in the past, or
to sell all holdings of a given financial product). Thanks to the richness of this
dataset, this paper conducts asset demand analyses on both the extensive and 
intensive margins on various types of financial assets, and this constitutes one of 
the main characteristics of the paper. Furthermore, this paper goes beyond just 
analyzing the behaviors of individual households by aggregating the estimated 
household behaviors and conducting simulations on the macroeconomic impact 
for quantitative examinations.
Specifically, our analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we analyze the
determinants of the likelihood of holding a given combination of financial products
using a multinomial logit model. This analysis tells us what types of factors are
important in asset allocation decisions along the extensive margin. In the second
stage, we analyze the factors that shift asset allocation along the intensive margin.
That is, conditional on the fact that a household has decided to hold a certain 
combination of financial products, we analyze how such a household allocates its
total funds among those products. Note that as this analysis focuses exclusively on
individual households which have chosen a specific combination of financial prod-
ucts for several reasons, the sample comprised solely of such households no longer
meets the premise of random sampling. In our analyses, we adopt a method that
explicitly addresses this self-selection bias.
Our main analytical findings can be summarized as follows.
(1) It is quantitatively important to include the fluctuations along the extensive
margin in considerations. The fluctuations in asset demand along the extensive
margin may be larger than those from the intensive margin in some cases.
(2) When household liquidity demand rises in reaction to low interest rates, or as
a measure to enhance savings safety, the demands for all kinds of assets aside
from cash also change. Moreover, the manner in which each type of asset
reacts differs depending on whether the increase in cash demand is a response
to low interest rates or a strategy to increase the safety of savings. 
(3) Promoting personal financial education increases the demand for risk assets
and for assets with low liquidity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the
dataset. Section III explicates the model adopted for the empirical analyses, and
Section IV presents the findings of those analyses. Section V presents the results of
simulations conducted using the findings in Section IV, and considers the signifi-
cance of the impact of the simulation results from the macroeconomic perspective.
Finally, Section VI presents a summary of the entire paper. 
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This section provides an explanation of the POS data.
A. Outline
The POS has been conducted from late June through early July each year since 1953
on households nationwide with at least two members. The survey asks questions
regarding the amount of household financial assets and liabilities, selection of financial
products, income and expenditures, and perception of the financial environment.
Some of the questions change from year to year, because these questions aim to ask
about “hot” issues in particular time periods. Since 1963, the POS has used a stratified
two-stage random sampling method to first select 400 survey areas and then randomly
select 15 households from each area for a total of 6,000 samples. While the data are 
not panel data, the survey has used the same sampling method over many years. 
Our analyses here use the survey data from 2001, 2002, and 2003. Out of the 6,000
households surveyed in those years, responses were obtained from 4,158 households,
4,149 households, and 4,234 households in each year, respectively. 
The POS provides two kinds of useful information that cannot be obtained from
any other data source.
First, it includes many qualitative questions regarding households’ perception of the
financial environment, which are not available elsewhere. These qualitative questions
can be used, for example, to statistically confirm if households that say they “think 
the private financial institutions they conduct transactions with are suffering from
worsening management conditions and may fall into bankruptcy” tend to have a low
level of deposits at private financial institutions and a high level of cash outstanding.
These kinds of analyses cannot be conducted using macro data. 
Second, the survey provides information on cash outstanding together with the
breakdown of financial assets outstanding by type of financial product held by a
household. The information on cash outstanding facilitates more detailed analyses
than those that can be conducted using the average household data derived from the
macro money stock statistics.
To begin with, for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 the macro money stock average
amounts outstanding statistics indicate small year-to-year growth in M2+CDs of 
2.8 percent, 3.3 percent, and 1.7 percent, respectively. A breakdown, however, reveals
that the year-to-year growth in M1 was 8.5 percent, 27.6 percent, and 8.2 percent,
while quasi-money decreased by 2.6 percent, 11.6 percent, and 3.6 percent. Moreover,
a breakdown of M1 shows that while cash currency in circulation grew by 6.7 percent,
11.2 percent, and 5.3 percent, there were wide fluctuations in deposit money of 
9.0 percent, 32.5 percent, and 9.0 percent. So even though the macroeconomic statistics
indicate small changes in the sum total of household-sector cash and demand deposits
plus time deposits, the figures may still suggest large fluctuations occurring in the
breakdown. The POS, which provides detailed figures for the amounts outstanding
of household-sector financial assets including both cash and other financial products,
provides extremely appropriate data for confirming this point.
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that they “do not hold any financial assets aside from cash.” While one might doubt
the significance of analyzing the behavior of such households, those households are
by no means exceptional: the number of such households actually accounted for 
16.7 percent (2001), 16.3 percent (2002), and 21.8 percent (2003) of the total sample.
One of the reasons why so many households responded that they “do not hold 
any financial assets aside from cash” is that the POS does not categorize deposits 
for industrial and commercial or for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries purposes, or
deposits that only remain briefly in bank accounts (such as salary transfers and account
transfers) as deposits. Another reason is that this survey only covers financial assets, 
and does not include land, housing, or other real assets. To consider the nature of this
question more closely, in Figure 1 we plot the historical evolution of the percentages 
of respondents who chose each answer to this same question, going all the way back 
to 1963. The percentage of households responding that they “do not hold any 
financial assets aside from cash” varies over time. Most notably, the percentage shows 
a sudden jump upward since around 2000. This suggests that it is indeed responding
to certain economic factors, and that it is important to include such households into
the analysis: our dataset enables us to do that.
We now explain the details of the variables used in our analysis in turn, dividing them
into continuous variables, qualitative variables, and household characteristics variables. 
B. Continuous Variables
First, we use the POS data to investigate the household financial assets outstanding by
type of financial product. In detail, the survey asks “Does your household currently
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Figure 1  Percentages of Households That Responded “Yes” or “No” to the Question















Households with savings (left scale)
Households without savings (right scale)
Source: Central Council for Financial Services Information, POS time-series data
file “Have or Do Not Have Savings” (Question 2).have any savings?” and those households that answer “yes” are asked to provide the 
outstanding amounts (to the nearest ¥10,000) of their deposits (both current deposits
and time deposits), postal savings (both postal savings current deposits and postal 
savings time deposits), money trusts and loan trusts, life insurance and postal life 
insurance, nonlife insurance, personal annuity insurance, bonds, stocks, investment
trusts, workers’ asset formation savings, and other financial products.
1
The POS also provides information on the average amount of cash outstanding.
Specifically, the survey investigates this by asking the question “In your household,
what is the average balance of cash on hand?” (to the nearest ¥10,000).
In the following analyses, we aggregate the household financial products holdings
into the four groups, cash; deposits; stocks and bonds (bonds, stocks, investment
trusts, and asset formation savings); and insurances (money trusts, loan trusts, life
insurance, postal life insurance, nonlife insurance, and personal annuity insurance).
Among these four groups, we then conduct analyses on the demand for the individual
deposit items: bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current
deposits, and postal savings time deposits. In addition to these, we make use of data
regarding annual take-home income over the past year (after-tax employment
income, pensions, real estate rental income, interest income, etc.), consumption
expenditures, and present total borrowings outstanding. In principle, our analysis 
is limited to financial assets because the POS does not report the market value of
household real estate holdings (and only notes whether or not the respondents own
their own homes). 
C. Qualitative Variables
The POS incorporates various qualitative questions. These are used in the analyses
here for the construction of the following dummy variables. 
First, we generated the following dummy variables regarding the household finan-
cial product selection criteria. The respondents were asked “Which point does your
household emphasize most when selecting a financial product?” and instructed to
choose one of the following eight answers: (1) Can expect high yield; (2) Can expect
capital gains; (3) The principal is guaranteed; (4) The financial institution handling
the product is safe and trustworthy; (5) The product scheme is easy to understand;
(6) Can be cashed without difficulty; (7) Can make deposits and withdrawals, even
of small amounts, without difficulty; (8) Other.
We generated a yield-emphasis dummy, with a value of one, for those households
that selected (1) Can expect high yield, or (2) Can expect capital gains. We generated
a safety-emphasis dummy, with a value of one, for those households that selected 
(3) The principal is guaranteed, or (4) The financial institution handling the product
is safe and trustworthy. Finally, we generated a liquidity-emphasis dummy, with a
value of one, for those households that selected (6) Can be cashed without difficulty,
or (7) Can make deposits and withdrawals, even of small amounts, without difficulty.
Because the households could also select responses (5) and (8), the sum of these three
dummy variables does not equal one.
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1. The data we actually received were rounded off to the three highest digits.Second, we then used the following question to control the household’s preference
for risky financial products. The respondents were asked “When selecting financial
products, where does your view stand between the following two views concerning
risk—the chance to gain high returns and the possibility of losing investment 
principal” and instructed to indicate if their view is closer to (A) “Will choose a
financial product, even without a guarantee of its principal, if there is a chance to 
get appropriate returns for the risk involved,” or closer to (B) “Will not choose a
financial product if its principal is not guaranteed.”
We generated a risk-accepter dummy, with a value of one, for those households that
selected “closer to (A)” and a risk-avoider dummy, with a value of one, for those house-
holds that selected “closer to (B).” Because the households could also select a third
response, “cannot say which,” the sum of these two dummy variables does not equal one.
Third, we generated a dummy variable regarding the household’s concern for the
soundness of private financial institutions. The respondents were asked “How much
are you interested in the financial conditions of financial institutions and in issues con-
cerning the financial system?” and instructed to select one of the following three answers:
(1) Very much; (2) Somewhat; and (3) Not much. Among these, we generated a 
concerned dummy, with a value of one, for those households that selected (1) Very much.
The respondents were then asked “Because some financial institutions have failed
in the past few years, what do you think about the financial conditions of the private
financial institutions you are dealing with?” and instructed to select one of the follow-
ing four answers: (1) Not worried because I think their financial conditions are sound;
(2) Do not think they will fail, even if their financial conditions have deteriorated
somewhat; (3) Worried because their financial conditions might deteriorate and they
could fail; and (4) Have nothing to do with the matter because I have no dealings with
private financial institutions. Among these, we generated a worried dummy, with a
value of one, for those households that selected (3) Worried because their financial
conditions might deteriorate and they could fail.
Fourth, to measure the extent to which personal financial education has penetrated,
the following question was used. The respondents were asked “The deposit insurance
system protects deposits of up to ¥10 million in principal, and their interest income,
on a per financial institution and per depositor basis. Do you know about this system?”
and were instructed to select one of the following three answers: (1) Yes, even know
about the details; (2) Have heard or read something about it; and (3) No, do not know
anything about it. Among these, we generated a known dummy, with a value of one,
for those households that selected (1) Yes, even know about the details, and an
unknown dummy, with a value of one for those households that responded (3) No, do
not know anything about it. Because the households could also select response (2), the
sum of these two dummy variables does not equal one.
Fifth, we used the following question to study the motivation for holding cash under
a low interest rate environment: “Given the current interest rate conditions, what kind
of actions has your household taken regarding savings?” The respondents were
instructed to select all of the following six answers that apply: (1) To increase dividend
and/or interest income as much as possible, switched to financial products expected to
yield higher interest and/or return; (2) Switched to short-term (or long-term) financial
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savings to spend for consumption, because of smaller-than-expected dividend and/or
interest income; (4) Decided to hold on to cash temporarily, refraining from invest-
ment in financial products; (5) No particular actions; and (6) Other. We then defined
a high-yield shift dummy, with a value of one, for those households that selected 
(1) To increase dividend and/or interest income as much as possible, switched to 
financial products expected to yield higher interest and/or return, a term shift dummy,
with a value of one, for those households that responded (2) Switched to short-term (or
long-term) financial products, anticipating changes in interest rates in the foreseeable
future, and a cash investment because of low interest rates dummy, with a value of one,
for those households that responded (4) Decided to hold on to cash temporarily,
refraining from investment in financial products.
Sixth, to investigate how households secure the safety of their financial products,
the respondents were asked “What actions have you taken to enhance the security 
of your financial assets?” and instructed to select all of the following nine answers 
that apply: (1) Collected information concerning the safety of financial products; 
(2) Switched deposits to financial institutions believed to be more financially sound 
and trustworthy; (3) Switched to products covered by the deposit insurance system; 
(4) Diversified deposits among multiple financial institutions so that deposits at any
one institution do not exceed ¥10 million; (5) Moved the portion of a time deposit or
other deposit exceeding ¥10 million to payment and settlement account deposits, such
as ordinary deposits, for which the full amount is protected until year-end March 2003,
within the same financial institution; (6) Withdrew the portion of deposits exceeding
¥10 million, deposited in a single financial institution, and invested in other types 
of assets (Japanese government bonds, gold, etc.); (7) Decided to hold on to cash; 
(8) Have not taken any actions; and (9) Others. Among these, we defined a deposit
switch dummy, with a value of one, for those households that responded (2) Switched
deposits to financial institutions believed to be more financially sound and trustworthy,
and a cash investment for safety dummy, with a value of one, for those households that
responded (7) Decided to hold on to cash. 
Finally, households were asked “What type of housing do you live in now?” and
those which replied “House or condominium that I purchased myself” or “Housing
that I inherited or that was given to me” were defined as homeowner households 
and given a homeowner dummy. Incidentally, the non-homeowner households were
defined as those which responded “House owned by parents or other relatives I live
with,” “Private condominium, apartment house, or individual house for rent,”
“Public apartment house for rent,” “Employer-provided (government, private firm)
housing,” or “Room for rent, or others.” 
D. Household Characteristics Variables 
The POS also records information about the number of household members, age of
the head of the household, job category of the head of the household, state of
employment of household members, and household location. 
First, for the number of household members, the respondents were asked “How
many people are there in your household, including yourself?” and instructed to 
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the age of the head of the household, the respondents were given a choice of 20s, 30s, 
40s, 50s, 60–64, 65–69, or 70 or older. For the job category of the head of the 
household, the possible answers were “Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries,” “Business
proprietor (commerce, industry, or services),” “White-collar worker,” “Blue-collar
worker,” “Manager,” “Professional worker,” and “Other.” Finally, for the state of
employment of household members, the options were “No one in the household,
including the head, is working,” “Only the head of the household is working,” “The
head of the household and his/her spouse are working,” and “Other.” Additionally, 
the survey recorded household location information by geographic region (among 
nine regions nationwide) and population scale with the following six population 
scale categories: (1) Japan’s 14 largest cities;
2 (2) city with at least 40,000 households;
(3) town with 20,000–40,000 households; (4) town with 10,000–20,000 households;
(5) town with fewer than 10,000 households; and (6) county area. We generated
dummy variables for the answers to each of the characteristics questions. For the 
question on the job category of the head of the household, however, we only used a 
dummy for business proprietors (commerce, industry, or services). Also, for analytical 
convenience, we combined population scale categories (4) and (5) for some parts of 
the analyses. 
III. Models
In this section, we explain the statistical and empirical models used in this paper,
after a literature review. 
A. Literature Review
This paper aims to analyze a situation where individual households hold either a 
single type or several (but not necessarily all) types of financial products among all
the types that are available. From that perspective, we now need an empirical model
that enables us to estimate conditional demand functions: they are conditional in the
sense that “a household’s demand for a given type of financial product is dependent
upon what kinds of other financial products it holds.” We summarize the previous
research incorporating this kind of analysis below. 
In the literature, King and Leape (1998) share the same motivation as ours. Their
paper uses data on U.S. household financial assets outstanding and estimates discrete
and continuous demand functions for each type of financial asset. King and Leape
(1998) divide the 11 types of financial products surveyed into four groups. They first
derive predictions on the likelihood that a household holds each type of financial
product using a probit model. They then estimate demand functions for each of 
the 11 types of financial products, adding this predicted likelihood as an explanatory
variable. In that process, they add an inverse Mill’s ratio (described below) from
Heckman (1979) as an explanatory variable to eliminate the self-selection bias that
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2. The 14 cities are Sapporo, Sendai, Saitama, Chiba, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima,
Kita-Kyushu, Fukuoka, and Tokyo (within the 23 wards).emerges from the fact that the households themselves have selected each of the 
financial products they are holding. 
Their statistical method to eliminate the self-selection bias seems to have room for
improvement. When households select which types of financial products they will
hold, they should take all the possibilities into consideration and make simultaneous
decisions on whether or not to hold each of the different types of financial products.
Accordingly, in an attempt to remove the self-selection bias, rather than inde-
pendently addressing the selection of whether or not to hold each type of product
one at a time, the use of a multinomial probit model may be more appropriate. 
As a practical problem, however, the application of this kind of analysis is difficult
because with the multinomial probit model the analytic solution to the probability 
of making a given selection cannot be derived, even when assuming a multivariate
normal distribution for the error term. Thus, it is difficult to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimator.
To cope with the self-selection bias in this problem, we adopt the method of
Dubin and McFadden (1984). Their method uses a multinomial logit approach to
the first stage of the discrete and continuous decision-making problem, which makes
the estimation relatively simple even for cases with a large number of selections.
While Dubin and McFadden (1984) use this method to estimate an electric power
demand function, the same method has already been applied to household financial
asset data in several nations. To the best of our knowledge, this method was first
applied to the asset selection problem by Amemiya, Saito, and Shimono (1993), who
conducted analyses using Japanese data. Among the various models used in that
paper, the second model applies the Dubin and McFadden (1984) method to 
estimate demand functions for bank deposits, bonds, and stocks (assuming that all
the households hold some bank deposits). Perraudin and Sørensen (2000) use U.S.
micro data and apply the Dubin and McFadden (1984) method to estimate demand
functions for liquid assets, stocks, and bonds (assuming that all the households hold
some liquid assets), and conduct simulation analyses using the estimation results.
In our paper, following Dubin and McFadden (1984), we assume that a multi-
nomial logit model approximates a household’s first-stage selection.
3 With the 
multinomial logit model, when there are s choices (0, 1, 2,..., s − 1) the probability
P(ij) that the choiceYi made by individual i will take the value j can be described by
a simple formula. In our analyses, each of the individual “choices” corresponds to a
product of decisions on whether or not to hold each of the available types of financial
products. For example, when there are two types of products, A and B, because sepa-
rate decisions can be made on holding or not holding each of these products, there
are a total of four (2 × 2 = 4) possible “choices.” We refer to each of these choices as a
“product combination” or just “combination” for short.
In the second stage, once a particular “combination” has been selected, decisions are
made on how much of each of the products that are included in this “combination”
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3. As noted above, with the multinomial probit model, which assumes a multinomial normal distribution for the
error term, it is not possible to derive the analytical solution to the probability for each of the alternatives to be
chosen. It is thus costly to maximize the likelihood function and seek the maximum likelihood estimator, requiring
massive numerical calculations. Thus, the multinomial probit model is not suitable for analyses which, like those
in this paper, involve a large number of selections.will be held, in other words, the conditional demand. It is known that self-selection
bias emerges when standard econometric techniques such as the least squares method
are used for estimating this conditional demand function. This is because a sample
comprised solely of households that have selected a certain combination does not meet
the requirement of a random sample of all households. Heckman (1979) considers a
discrete continuous decision-making model where the first stage is a binomial selection
while the second stage is a choice of a continuous variable. He proposes use of a probit
model for the first-stage estimation. From this estimation, the inverse Mill’s ratio is
computed and added to the second-stage estimation as an explanatory variable to 
eliminate the self-selection bias. The method employed by Dubin and McFadden
(1984) basically follows the same idea, but applies to the case where the first-stage
selection is characterized by a multinomial logit model. Like Heckman (1979), they
derive additional explanatory variables from the first-stage estimation to eliminate the
self-selection bias in the second stage. The number of such variables is equal to the 
number of choices minus one. We refer to these variables, which jointly play the role
of the inverse Mill’s ratio in Heckman (1979), as “self-selection bias adjustment
terms.” By introducing these variables into the second-stage estimation, a two-stage
estimation like that of Heckman (1979) becomes possible. 
We explain the details of this method below. First, we start with the second-stage
choice, that is, the choice of the amount of a particular financial product given that
the first-stage decision has already been made. In other words, we explain the choice
along the intensive margin conditional on the choice along the extensive margin.
Suppose that a household i has selected the j-th combination of products. Suppose
also that this combination includes the k-th type of product and that the demand for
this product by household i is a function of household characteristics, as shown in
equation (1). 
y(ij)k
* =X(ij)k′ (j)k +u(ij)k. (1)
Here y(ij)k
* is the amount of the k-th product held by household i when it chooses
the j-th combination. X(ij)k denotes a vector of variables that represent household
characteristics,  (j)k is the parameter vector to be estimated, and u(ij) is an error
term with zero mean and variance of  
2.
Second, we explain the choice along the extensive margin, in other words, the
choice of the product combination. Now letV(ij) be the indirect utility of household
i that selects the j-th combination, and normalize the value of the indirect utility
derived from the s-th combination asV(is) = 0. Here, when household i selects the
j-th product combination, it must be the case that it yields the highest indirect utility
compared with any other combinations. Thus, equation (2) holds for that household.
V(ij) >V(il),l ≠ j. (2)
Now, letV(ij) be a linear function of the vector of the explanatory variablesX(ij). 
V(ij) =X(ij)′ (i)+ (ij),     j = 1, 2, 3,...,s −1. (3)
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 (ij)is independent and the distribution function is exp[−exp( )].
4
Equation (3) shows that the households’ choices of product combinations are
endogenous, dependent on the explanatory variables X(ij). Under such a situation, 
if a researcher estimates the conditional demand function by applying standard 
ordinary least square (OLS) methods to equation (1), the researcher obtains biased esti-
mates. The bias appears because the distribution of error term,u(ij)k in equation (1)
conditional upon household i’s choice of product set j is not the same as the uncondi-
tional distribution of error termu(ij)k. Dubin and McFadden (1984) resolve the bias
by including some additional explanatory variables. To apply their method, we need 
to assume that the conditional expected value of u(ij)k given the indirect utility of
household product holding pattern j,V(ij), should be given by equation (4). 
s−1
E[u(ij)k (i1),  (i2),..., (is −1)] = R(j)k(m)( (im) − ), (4)
m=1
s−1
 R(j)k(m) = 0,
m=1
  = Euler’s constant.
In equation (4), R(j) k(m) are constant terms to be estimated.
In the actual data, y(ij)k
* is observed when the j-thproduct combination is selected
and the k-th product is included therein. So, using equation (4), the conditional
expected value becomes as shown in equation (5). 
E[y(ij)k
*j chosen] (5)
= X(ij)k′  +E[u(ij)k
*j chosen]
s−1
= X(ij)k′  + (√
––
6 / ) R(j)k(m)(E( (im)j chosen) − ),
m=1
  + logP(im), m ≠ j
E( (im)j chosen) = 
  + logP(im)(P(im)/1−P(im)), m = j.
Here P(im) shows the probability that household i will select the m-th product com-
bination. Comparing equation (5) and equation (1), one can see that the conditional
expected value is the sum of the unconditional expected value and a new term,
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4. The multinomial logit model adopts the strong assumption that “the relative probability that a given option will
be chosen remains independent and constant, even when other new options are introduced.” For example, if the
options for traveling between Tokyo and Osaka are the Nozomi bullet train, an All Nippon Airways flight, and a
highway bus, since these options reflect the preference for railroad, airplane, and automobile, it is reasonable to
assume that additional options may not have much influence. However, if the options for traveling between Tokyo
and Osaka are the Nozomi bullet train, an All Nippon Airways flight, and a Japan Airlines flight, the options All
Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines are probably not mutually independent. Nevertheless, once this strong
assumption is accepted, the multinomial logit model has the merit that the likelihood function is defined in accor-
dance with equation (3), and by maximizing this the volume of computations required to calculate the parameters
is within the range that can be processed by a personal computer. s−1
(√
––
6 / ) R(j)k(m)(E( (im)j chosen) − ).
m=1
Like Heckman (1979), this model enables a two-stage estimation. First, a multi-
nomial logit model is used to estimate equation (3), which is then used to determine
the estimated value of P(im), which isP ˆ(im). Then P ˆ(im) is inserted into equation (5)
to compute E( (im)j chosen) −   for each product combination m. Finally, by 
estimating equation (5) using both X(ij)k and the estimates of E( (im)j chosen) − 
(m = 1, 2,...,s − 1) as explanatory variables through the least squares method, we
can obtain the household conditional asset demand function.
B. Statistical Model in This Paper
In this paper, we first aggregate the financial products held by households into the 
following four broad groups: cash; deposits; stocks and bonds (bonds, stocks, invest-
ment trusts, and asset formation savings); and insurances (money trusts, loan trusts, 
life insurance, postal life insurance, nonlife insurance, and personal annuity insurance).
Among these, all households hold cash, but the other three groups of assets are held by
some households and not held by others. 
We are also interested in estimating demand for the individual items that belong
to the “deposits” group. These are bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal
savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits. Hereafter, we refer to these
as deposit “subgroups.” The most natural approach to accomplish this objective
would be to estimate a huge multinomial logit model in which households choose
whether or not to hold positive amounts of assets that belong to the “stocks and
bonds” and the “insurances” groups, and, at the same time, choose whether or not to
hold each of the four deposit subgroups. In such a model, however, the number of
product combinations that households have to consider would be 4 × 2
4 = 64. For
some of the product combinations, the sample sizes for the second-stage estimation
of the conditional demand function would fall below 100. Meanwhile, the number
of self-selection bias adjustment factors would grow extremely large. To avert these
problems, our paper adopts the following assumptions regarding the household 
decision-making process. 
First, households determine the allocation of funds to each of the four broad
product groups (cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances). As all households
hold cash, they choose from the five product combinations: “cash only,” “cash and
deposits,” “cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds,” “cash, deposits, and insurances,”
and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances.” Then for those households
that choose an option other than “cash only,” they determine the amounts of 
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5. The sample included a very small number of households that hold cash and insurances, or cash and stocks and
bonds (or cash and insurance and stocks and bonds) without holding any deposits. However, since the numbers of
such households are too small to handle as individual samples in estimating the conditional demand function, they
are all categorized in the group holding “cash, deposits, and insurances.”Next, given the total amount of deposits, households determine allocations to the
four subgroups of deposits. In other words, with the allocation among the four broad
groups as a given, decisions are made regarding whether or not to hold each of the
deposit subgroups: bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current
deposits, and postal savings time deposits. Then, households choose the amounts 
of each of those deposit subgroups that they have decided to hold. Since there are 16
possible combinations of the four deposit subgroups, asset demand functions for the
four are estimated for each of those 16 combinations. The entire picture of this 
discrete continuous decision making is depicted in Figure 2. 
The theoretical backgrounds for our approach are as follows. First, as for the cate-
gorization of assets into groups, as noted for example in Tachibanaki and Tanigawa
(1990), these different product groups have different transaction costs. For example,
while households can easily adjust their deposits outstanding, they probably only
adjust most of their insurance products a few times a year, at most. Furthermore, since
stock trading commissions are higher than banking fees, households probably refrain
from frequent stock trading. An alternative interpretation, as frequently noted in
financial asset analyses, is that products such as stocks and bonds, which have a high
price fluctuation risk in comparison with deposits (which are highly liquid), have a 
different nature from products like insurance, which has a very long-term contract
period compared with deposits. 
Next, the sequential structure of decision making between the broad group stage
and the subgroup stage reflects our assumption that it is possible to separate the selec-
tion among the four broad groups from the selection among the subgroups within
the deposits group. Specifically, the households first compare financial products in
terms of their transaction costs, maturity dates, risk, and other factors to determine
the allocation of total funds among the four broad groups, including deposits. Then,
those households that have chosen to hold a positive amount of deposits choose 
their allocations among the four subgroups. In this manner, we assume that the only
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time depositsinfluence from the decision on broad groups comes through the total amount 
for overall deposits. This assumption is justified if we assume that the part of the
household utility function that depends only on the shares of deposit subgroups 
in overall deposits is separable from the other parts and, at the same time, that the
prices of the different deposit subgroups are all equal.
6 This assumption helps keep
the calculations from becoming too difficult by preventing the number of options a
household faces at the same time from growing too large.
C. Empirical Model in This Paper
We used the 2001, 2002, and 2003 data from the POS to estimate the following
function.
Ait =  + 1•Z1it + 2•Z2it + 3•Z3it + 4•(Year dummy) +uit. (6)
Here the subscript i represents a household and t indicates a period (t = 2001, 2002,
2003). For the first-stage estimation, the dependent variable A is a dummy variable
indicating whether the household chooses a given combination of financial products.
This is estimated using the multinomial logit model, as explained in the previous 
section. For the second-stage estimation of conditional demand, the dependent 
variable A represents the share of each type of financial product in total assets, rather
than its amount itself.
The explanatory variables are divided into three categories. Z1 represents the 
continuous variables, which include either total financial assets for the decisions on
broad product groups or total deposits for the decisions on deposit subgroups (both
in logarithms), expenditures (in logarithm), and borrowings (as a ratio to total assets).
Z2 represents the household characteristics variables Z2, such as the age group
dummy, employment conditions dummy, self-employment dummy, homeowner dummy,
and location dummy. For the second-stage estimation, the self-selection bias adjust-
ment terms are also included. Z3 represents the qualitative variables. They include
the six dummy variables defined in the previous section, that is, criteria for product
selection, risk preference, concern for financial system stability, prevalence of personal
financial education, motivation to hold cash under low interest rates, and means of
securing the safety of financial products. 
We shall consider the data obtained from the survey as a random sample extracted
using the same methods over the three years, which allows us to pool the samples
from those three years. We control the differences in survey year by introducing a
year dummy in the regression equation. Note that this dummy absorbs the influences
of macro shocks. 
Table 1 [1] shows the correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables used
in this research, with theage group dummy andlocation dummy omitted to save space.
This table indicates that none of the correlations among the explanatory variables is
high enough to generate a multicollinearity problem. Also, Table 1 [2] presents the
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6. This assumption can be justified because throughout our sample period the nominal interest rate, which is the
opportunity cost of deposits and savings, was almost zero.88 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2006
Table 1  Correlation Coefficients among the Explanatory Variables
[1] Correlation Coefficients
Total assets  Expenditures Concerned Worried Yield- Safety- Liquidity- Risk- Risk-
(logarithm) (logarithm) emphasis emphasis emphasis acceptor avoider
Total assets (logarithm) 1.000
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.327 1.000
Concerned 0.135 0.063 1.000
Worried –0.002 0.008 0.024 1.000
Yield-emphasis 0.096 0.043 0.098 0.001 1.000
Safety-emphasis 0.280 0.097 0.032 –0.002 –0.398  1.000
Liquidity-emphasis –0.057 –0.065 –0.081  0.007 –0.237 –0.568  1.000
Risk-acceptor  0.071 0.044 0.144 –0.023  0.274 –0.148 –0.045  1.000
Risk-avoider 0.053 0.023 –0.071  0.036 –0.167  0.217 –0.050 –0.388  1.000
Known 0.272 0.151 0.277  –0.022 0.067 0.119  –0.121 0.136  –0.021
Unknown –0.305 –0.157 –0.096  0.002 –0.025 –0.136  0.075 –0.056 –0.094
High-yield  shift 0.181 0.033 0.158 0.011 0.232  –0.018  –0.125 0.177  –0.119
Term  shift 0.173 0.049 0.113 0.027 0.038 0.072  –0.077 0.031  –0.009
Cash investment because  0.043 0.022 0.020 0.033  –0.012  –0.014 0.028 0.028  –0.002 of low interest rates
Deposit  switch 0.161 0.043 0.132 0.020 0.039 0.085  –0.081 0.044 0.025
Cash  investment  for  safety –0.040 –0.014 0.010 0.038 0.011  –0.059 0.027 0.023  –0.031
Has  borrowings –0.252 –0.062 –0.020  0.007 –0.024 –0.045 –0.008 –0.014  0.008
Number of household members –0.047  0.222 –0.029  0.018  0.011 –0.020 –0.003 –0.028  0.041
Cash




High-yield shift 0.141  –0.077  1.000
Term  shift 0.128  –0.086 0.197 1.000
Cash investment because of  0.051 –0.030 –0.039  0.021  1.000 low interest rates
Deposit  switch 0.127  –0.081 0.225 0.196 0.075 1.000
Cash  investment  for  safety 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.304 0.003 1.000
Has  borrowings –0.015  0.022 –0.028 –0.029 –0.013 –0.021  0.014  1.000
Number of household members –0.071  0.039 –0.034 –0.048 –0.027 –0.017 –0.020  0.055 
[2] Cramer’s V
Concerned Worried Yield- Safety- Liquidity- Risk- Risk-
emphasis emphasis emphasis acceptor avoider
Concerned 1.000
Worried 0.032 1.000
Yield-emphasis 0.093 0.017 1.000
Safety-emphasis 0.040 –0.008 –0.353  1.000
Liquidity-emphasis –0.067  0.008 –0.225 –0.519  1.000
Risk-acceptor  0.134 –0.015  0.254 –0.128 –0.040  1.000
Risk-avoider –0.042  0.035 –0.130  0.232 –0.042 –0.347  1.000 
Known 0.274  –0.027 0.072 0.134  –0.100 0.136 0.010 
Unknown –0.101 –0.015 –0.037 –0.160  0.051 –0.054 –0.117 
High-yield  shift 0.143 0.012 0.214 0.006  –0.106 0.168  –0.087 
Term  shift 0.110 0.032 0.044 0.079  –0.062 0.044  –0.003 
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.025  0.031  –0.002  –0.006  0.019  0.034  0.000 
Deposit  switch 0.128 0.026 0.039 0.093  –0.061 0.035 0.041 
Cash  investment  for  safety 0.007 0.034 0.007  –0.051 0.016 0.019  –0.036
Cash




High-yield shift 0.145  –0.077  1.000
Term  shift 0.134  –0.088 0.183 1.000
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.049  –0.036  –0.026  0.024  1.000
Deposit  switch 0.134  –0.090 0.223 0.197 0.077 1.000
Cash investment for safety 0.001  0.012  0.012  –0.005  0.296  0.001Cramer’s V, which is a type of correlation coefficient among qualitative variables.
7 This
index takes a value between zero and one, with figures closer to one indicating a higher
level of association. The index values do not indicate any remarkably high associations
among the explanatory variables.
IV. Estimation Results 
This section presents the results of our analyses. 
A. Selection of Product Combination (Extensive Margin), for Broad 
Product Groups
First, to analyze the decision along the extensive margin, or the selection of product
combination, we use a multinomial logit model to conduct analyses, following 
equation (6), on the selection from the following five product combinations: “cash”;
“cash and deposits”; “cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds”; “cash, deposits, and 
insurances”; and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances.” The estimation
results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
In this estimation, the total asset holdings amount is treated as a given condition.
The households that choose “cash, deposits, and insurances” are used as the benchmark,
and the characteristics of the households that selected the other four combinations 
are calculated in comparison with these benchmark households. Table 2 presents 
the estimated coefficients in the multinomial logit model in the form of equation (6).
On the other hand, Table 3 presents the marginal effects computed from this result,
that is, the amount by which the probability of a given product combination changes
when an explanatory variable on the right side of the equation changes marginally by
one unit.
8
The marginal effects reported in Table 3 are the gap between the direct effects (of
the estimated coefficient on the explanatory variable for the choice under question)
and the indirect effect (the change in the left-hand side variable in equation [6] for 
the other choices taken together, caused by the change in the explanatory variable; 
this is equal to the weighted average of the estimated coefficients for those choices),
multiplied by the probability of choosing a given product combination. Thus, when
the indirect effects are sufficiently large, it is possible that the direct effects and the
marginal effects have different signs. Also, the size and the standard errors of the 
marginal effects are evaluated at the sample average of each explanatory variable.
9 We
are also interested in how to determine the likelihood of the choice of a particular
product combination by a household with certain characteristics that might not 
necessarily be the same as those of an average household. We now explain the findings
presented in Table 2 together with those presented in Table 3. 
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7. For a definition and explanation of the Cramer’sV, see Takeuchi (1989, p. 341).
8. Among the explanatory variables, however, those defined as dummy variables take values of only zero or one, so
strictly speaking they cannot be changed marginally. Accordingly, the following analyses should be understood as
an approximation aimed at gaining useful information.
9. We used the equation presented in Greene (1997, p. 917) for the calculation of the standard error.90 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2006
Table 2  Selection of Product Combinations for Broad Asset Groups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Estimation Results
Cash and Cash, deposits, Cash, deposits,
Cash only deposits and stocks stocks and bonds, 
and bonds and insurances
Total assets (logarithm) –2.572*** –0.744*** –0.034 0.808***
Expenditures (logarithm) 1.054*** 0.114 0.500*** 0.519***
Concerned –0.105 0.485*** 0.560***
Worried 0.020 –0.184* –0.033
Yield-emphasis 1.175*** 1.220*** 0.559***
Safety-emphasis 1.010*** 0.558** 0.105
Liquidity-emphasis 0.917*** 0.206 –0.221
Risk-acceptor 0.654* –0.077 0.657*** 0.613***
Risk-avoider –0.274 –0.031 –0.346*** –0.246***
Known –0.063 0.058 0.410*** 0.345***
High-yield shift 0.681* 0.172 0.621*** 0.534***
Term shift 0.441 0.157 0.196 0.321***
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.454 –0.118 –0.222 0.022
Cash investment for safety 1.112*** 0.251 0.056 –0.380*
Has borrowings 0.025*** 0.011 0.026*** 0.026***
Number of household members 0.011 –0.130*** –0.106** –0.018
Head of household in 30s 0.925** 0.056 –0.265 –0.146
Head of household in 40s 0.912* –0.232 –0.933*** –0.471*
Head of household in 50s 2.094*** 0.083 –0.703** –0.682**
Head of household 60–64 2.681*** 0.550** –0.903*** –1.111***
Head of household 65–69 3.225*** 0.550** –0.998*** –0.928***
Head of household 70 or over 2.385*** 0.834*** –0.350 –1.113***
Self-employed –0.085 –0.172* –0.731*** –0.637***
Homeowner –0.367* –0.038 –0.006 0.136
Unemployed 0.543 0.191 0.209 0.054
Only head of household employed 0.269 0.054 0.223 0.344***
Spouse also employed 0.341 0.033 0.064 0.143
2002 dummy –0.874*** –0.237*** –0.228** –0.067
2001 dummy –0.543** –0.124 –0.316*** –0.152*
Hokkaido 0.179 0.190 –0.311 –0.261
Tohoku –0.585 0.263 0.176 0.063
Kanto –0.003 0.255* 0.302 0.122
Hokuriku –0.503 0.226 0.335 0.193
Chubu –0.300 0.179 0.329 0.201
Kinki 0.043 0.373** 0.577** 0.182
Shikoku –0.455 0.579*** 0.502 0.181
Kyushu –0.589 0.163 0.073 –0.118
City scale 2 –0.234 0.153 –0.282** –0.011
City scale 3 0.122 0.249* –0.301* –0.089
City scale 4 0.438 0.271* –0.372* –0.216
City scale 5 –0.279 –0.189 –0.496 –0.652**
City scale 6 –0.102 –0.012 –0.639*** –0.357***
Constant 3.446*** 2.177*** –3.905*** –8.727***
Note: Benchmark group holds cash, deposits, and insurances. Number of samples is 7,945. *, **, and ***show
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.91
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Table 3  Selection of Product Combinations for Broad Asset Groups, Estimation
Results (Marginal Effects)
Cash, Cash, Cash, deposits,
Cash only Cash and deposits, deposits, stocks and
deposits and stocks and  bonds, and
and bonds insurances insurances
Total assets (logarithm) –0.297*** –0.087*** 0.015*** 0.086*** 0.284***
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.092*** –0.038*** 0.012* –0.118*** 0.051***
Concerned –0.021*** –0.047** 0.023*** –0.060*** 0.106***
Worried 0.002 0.007 –0.012* 0.007 –0.004
Yield-emphasis –0.056*** 0.127*** 0.056*** –0.158*** 0.032
Safety-emphasis –0.031*** 0.133*** 0.023 –0.087*** –0.038
Liquidity-emphasis –0.015* 0.139*** 0.007 –0.041* –0.091***
Risk-acceptor 0.047 –0.062*** 0.027*** –0.101*** 0.089***
Risk-avoider –0.018 0.018 –0.016** 0.047*** –0.031*
Known –0.024 –0.012 0.021*** –0.045*** 0.060***
High-yield shift 0.048 –0.023 0.023*** –0.109*** 0.062***
Term shift 0.033 –0.005 0.001 –0.066** 0.037
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.054 –0.025 –0.018 –0.010 –0.001
Cash investment for safety 0.131*** 0.029 –0.002 –0.031 –0.126***
Has borrowings 0.001*** –0.001 0.001*** –0.005*** 0.003***
Number of household members 0.006 –0.017*** –0.005* 0.012** 0.004
Head of household in 30s 0.109** –0.002 –0.024 –0.025 –0.058
Head of household in 40s 0.131*** –0.020 –0.059*** 0.042 –0.095*
Head of household in 50s 0.261*** 0.007 –0.054*** –0.016 –0.197***
Head of household 60–64 0.333*** 0.083*** –0.070*** –0.025 –0.320***
Head of household 65–69 0.388*** 0.064* –0.085*** –0.065 –0.301***
Head of household 70 or over 0.288*** 0.123*** –0.034 –0.044 –0.334***
Self-employed 0.023 0.016 –0.034*** 0.095*** –0.100***
Homeowner –0.045* –0.004 0.001 0.006 0.041***
Unemployed 0.052 0.010 0.006 –0.047* –0.021
Only head of household employed 0.015 –0.017 0.005 –0.055*** 0.052***
Spouse also employed 0.032 –0.010 –0.002 –0.033 0.014
2002 dummy –0.088*** –0.009 –0.003 0.067*** 0.033*
2001 dummy –0.050* 0.005 –0.012 0.055*** 0.001
Hokkaido 0.028 0.039 –0.020 0.013 –0.060
Tohoku –0.075 0.046* 0.013 0.000 0.017
Kanto –0.013 0.027 0.015 –0.035 0.006
Hokuriku –0.071 0.030 0.020 –0.018 0.038
Chubu –0.047 0.019 0.019 –0.025 0.035
Kinki –0.015 0.037 0.030** –0.057* 0.006
Shikoku –0.074 0.078*** 0.027 –0.046 0.015
Kyushu –0.066 0.041* 0.011 0.026 –0.012
City scale 2 –0.027 0.031*** –0.019*** 0.010 0.004
City scale 3 0.014 0.041*** –0.023** –0.005 –0.028
City scale 4 0.054 0.044** –0.028** –0.006 –0.063**
City scale 5 0.000 0.016 –0.016 0.100* –0.101*
City scale 6 0.007 0.025 –0.035*** 0.056*** –0.054***
Constant 0.672*** 0.694*** –0.150*** 0.651*** –1.867***
Note: Number of samples is 7,945. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.The second column of Table 2 shows that, compared with the benchmark house-
holds, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, households with low total
assets, and households with borrowings and which hang on to cash for safety have a
high probability of selecting “cash only.”
10,11
Looking at the second column of Table 3, when evaluated at the 1 percent signifi-
cance level, we find that those households with a high probability of selecting “cash
only” tend to have low total assets, high expenditures, low concern for the soundness
of private financial institutions, and low concern about yield and safety, but they 
prefer cash investment for safety reasons, have borrowings, and often do not own
their own homes. 
The third column of Table 2 indicates that in comparison with the benchmark
households, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, households with 
low total assets, and those which emphasize yield, safety, and liquidity have a high
probability of selecting “cash and deposits.” The difference versus the benchmark
households is that these households do not hold pensions and other long-term finan-
cial assets, so these results are consistent with our prior expectations. Looking at the
third column of Table 3, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, house-
holds with a high probability of selecting “cash and deposits” have low total assets
and expenditures, emphasize yield, safety, and liquidity, and are not risk-tolerant. 
The fourth column of Table 2 indicates that in comparison with the benchmark
households, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, households that
emphasize yield, are risk-tolerant, seek high profits, are highly concerned about the
managerial conditions of financial institutions and about financial system problems,
and have debts have a high probability of selecting “cash, deposits, and stocks and
bonds.” The fourth column of Table 2 indicates that, when evaluated at the 1 percent
significance level, households with a high probability of selecting “cash, deposits, 
and stocks and bonds” have high total assets, are greatly concerned about financial
institution management conditions and financial system problems, emphasize 
yield, accept risk, know about the deposit insurance system, seek high profits, and
have debts. 
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10. We eliminated the dummy variables corresponding to the answers given to the question “Which point does your
household emphasize the most when selecting a financial product” from the list of explanatory variables for those
households that selected “cash only.” Note that, for these variables, the question implicitly presumes that the
respondents hold some financial products other than cash. We thus judged that those variables cannot be used to
determine the probability of choosing “cash only.” 
11. An anonymous referee commented that, among the variables used in these analyses, the dummy variables for
high-yield shift, term shift, and cash investment for safety may produce an endogeneity bias. Our interpretation is
that these variables represent household preferences (more precisely, an interaction between household preferences
and macroeconomic conditions), and are therefore exogenous. 
Nevertheless, we conducted the following type of analysis to check for any evidence of an endogeneity bias. First,
we implemented probit analyses to obtain predicted values for these dummy variables, using the same variables 
used in Tables 2, 3, and 4 as explanatory variables. Next, we substituted the predicted values for the observed 
values of the dummy variables in the analyses in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The results revealed two problems. First, in the
probit analysis the values of what corresponds to the R
2 in the regular regressions were not all that high. Second,
almost none of the coefficients of these predicted values were significant, and we inferred that this is likely to be
because those fitted variables cause multicollinearity with the other explanatory variables. Consequently, we could
not discover any useful instrumental variables from the dataset, and concluded that it would be difficult to use
econometric methodology to check the endogeneity.Table 2 does not present the equation (6) estimation results for the probability of
selecting “cash, deposits, and insurances” because households that make this choice
are used as the benchmark, and thus the coefficients for this choice are all normalized
to be zero. Thus the “direct effect” from changing the value of an explanatory 
variable is zero by construction. However, the indirect effects, the effects on combina-
tions other than “cash, deposits, and insurances,” are not zero. Column 5 of Table 3,
which reports the marginal effects defined as the differentials between the direct
effects and the indirect effects multiplied by appropriate probability factors, indicates
that when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, the benchmark households
(which have “cash, deposits, and insurances”) have high total assets, low concern
regarding managerial conditions of financial institutions, do not emphasize yield or
safety, are risk-averse, have little knowledge about the deposit insurance system, and
do not seek high profits. 
Column 5 of Table 2 indicates that in comparison with the benchmark house-
holds, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, households with high assets,
where only the head of the household is employed, and with other characteristics that
are basically the same as those of households selecting “cash, deposits, and stocks and
bonds” have a high probability of selecting “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, 
and insurances.” Here the difference versus the benchmark households lies in the
additional holdings of stocks and bonds, so in the sense that these households 
welcome the risk that comes with holding stocks, these results are also consistent with
our prior expectations. 
Looking at column 6 of Table 3 we find that, when evaluated at the 1 percent sig-
nificance level, households with a high probability of selecting “cash, deposits, stocks
and bonds, and insurances” have high total assets and expenditures, are concerned
about the managerial conditions of financial institutions, do not emphasize liquidity,
tolerate risk, are knowledgeable regarding the deposit insurance system, seek high
profits, and do not hang on to cash for the sake of safety. 
The analyses to this point have used a multinomial logit model to determine how
households select from among the five product combination groups: “cash,” “cash
and deposits,” “cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds,” “cash, deposits, and insur-
ances,” and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances.” From the policy 
perspective, we might be more interested in knowing what kinds of households are
likely to hold stocks and bonds, regardless of which other asset groups they are 
holding. This information can be provided by summing up the marginal effects on
all the choices that include stocks and bonds in Table 3. Note that the households
which hold stocks and bonds hold either “cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds” or
“cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances.” Hence the information can be
gained by adding up the marginal effects on these two groups. Similarly, the set of
households holding insurances are the union of those selecting “cash, deposits, 
and insurances” and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances.” It should,
however, be noted that when calculating the standard error of the sum of those 
marginal effects, we cannot simply add up the standard errors around them: it is
important to take into account the covariances among them. 
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on holding insurances. The differences between those two are quite noticeable. The
probability that households will hold stocks and bonds rises along with emphasis on
yield, risk tolerance, knowledge of the deposit insurance system, and emphasis on
high profitability. In contrast, the probability of holding insurances declines with
greater emphasis on yield, safety, and liquidity factors.
B. Decisions on the Amount of Asset Holding (Intensive Margin), for Broad
Product Groups
Based on the multinomial logit model estimations in the previous section, we now 
analyze how the amount of cash holding is determined out of total assets. This 
analysis is conducted for each group of households that chose a particular product
combination other than “cash only.”
12 These are the four types of households select-
ing the product combinations “cash and deposits,” “cash, deposits, and stocks and
bonds,” “cash, deposits, and insurances” and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, 
and insurances.” For each of these, it is technically possible to estimate equation (6)
in its original form, but we found that this presented a problem. Theoretically, the
left-hand-side variable, which is the ratio of each financial product to the total funds,
should be between zero and one. However, when we simply estimated equation (6)
and ran simulation exercises, the predicted values did not necessarily lie between 
zero and one. To avoid this problem, we conducted a logistic transformation of the
left-hand side variable prior to estimation. That is to say, for the dependent variables
on the left-hand-side of equation (6), rather than using the ratio itself, we converted
this into the logarithm of (asset holding ratio)/[1 – (asset holding ratio)].
13
When the results using this transformation are used for the simulation, while the
predicted value of the left-hand-side variable may fluctuate widely, the predicted values
after transforming them back into the asset holding ratios always fall between zero and
one. For the case of a single explanatory variable, the logistically transformed equation
(6) takes the following functional form.
 Ai  ln –––––   =  + Zi +ui. (7)
1−Ai
We then use the following relation to consider the marginal effect of Z on the
dependent variableA. 
exp(  + Zi +ui) Ai = –––––––––––––––– –. (8)
1 + exp(  + Zi +ui)
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12. By definition, the conditional cash demand for households selecting “cash only” equals their total assets, so these
households are excluded from the analysis.
13. This problem is not resolved, for example, by using the amount itself or its logarithmic value in place of the ratio
on the left-hand side of the equation. This is because in that case the possibility that the predictive value of the
holdings amount may exceed the total assets cannot be eliminated.95
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Table 4  Selection of Product Combinations for Broad Asset Groups, Estimation
Results (Aggregated Marginal Effects)
Stocks and bonds Insurances
Total assets (logarithm) 0.299*** 0.369***









High-yield shift 0.084*** –0.047
Term shift 0.038 –0.029
Cash investment because of low interest rates –0.019 –0.011
Cash investment for safety –0.128 –0.157
Has borrowings 0.004*** –0.002***
Number of household members –0.001 0.016**
Head of household in 30s –0.082 –0.083
Head of household in 40s –0.154 –0.053
Head of household in 50s –0.251 –0.213
Head of household 60–64 –0.390 –0.345
Head of household 65–69 –0.386 –0.366




Only head of household employed 0.057*** –0.003
Spouse also employed 0.012 –0.019
2002 dummy 0.030 0.099***









City scale 2 –0.014 0.014
City scale 3 –0.050 –0.032
City scale 4 –0.091 –0.069
City scale 5 –0.116* –0.001
City scale 6 –0.089*** 0.002
Constant –2.017*** –1.216***
Note: Number of samples is 7,945. *, **, and *** show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively.Therefore
 Ai  exp(  + Zi +ui) ––– – = –––––––––––––––––– – = Ai(1−Ai). (9)
 Zi {1 + exp(  + Zi +ui)}
2
Thus, the effects of marginal effect of parameter   on Ai should be  Ai(1 −Ai) rather
than  . Because Ai(1 −Ai) takes a value between zero and one, the marginal effect is
smaller than the apparent parameter  . 
We first estimated the cash conditional demand functions for each of the four types
of households, and the estimation results are presented in columns 2–5 of Table 5. 
In column 6, we also presented the estimation results under the restriction that 
the coefficients of all the types must be equal, except for the constant terms and the
coefficients on total assets and on the self-selection adjustment terms. The estimates
for those unrestricted parameters are not reported here to save space. By comparing
columns 2 through 5, we can see that for most of the explanatory variables the 
influence changes depending on what other types of products are held. As a common
characteristic of each column, when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, 
there is a strong tendency for households to hold cash because of low total assets, low
interest rates, or for reasons of asset safety.
14
The finding that cash holdings increase in response to low interest rates are as would
be expected from the theory. It is interesting to observe that, even after controlling 
for the effect of low interest rates, the percentage of assets held as cash increases when
safety concerns are higher. 
Table 6 analyzes the factors that determine the ratio of deposits to total financial
assets. The table is organized in the same way as Table 5.
15 Columns 2–5 indicate
that, for many variables, their effects vary greatly depending on what kind of other
assets are being held. We observe a tendency that for households which increase their
cash holdings because of low interest rates, deposits tend to decrease. 
C. Selection of Product Combinations (Extensive Margin), 
for Deposit Subgroups
Our analyses thus far have addressed the household selection of holding patterns
among the five broad product groups, “cash,” “cash and deposits,” “cash, deposits, and
stocks and bonds,” “cash, deposits, and insurances,” and “cash, deposits, stocks and
bonds, and insurances” as well as the amounts of each of those product groups held. 
These analyses help us understand the mechanism of how households decide their
cash holdings. But they are not sufficient to understand the effects of shifts in asset
demand within the “deposits” category, such as a shift from bank deposits to postal
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14. Columns 2–4 indicate that households classified as risk-averse have low cash demand. To us, this was an unex-
pected finding. This might be because the group of households that responded to this question with the answer
“cannot say which” (the households that were adopted as the standard) probably included many households with
little interest in the issue of selecting financial products (we expect such households to have a strong cash orienta-
tion). Alternatively, those households responding that they “will not choose a financial product if its principal is
not guaranteed” have a strong preference for government-guaranteed products such as postal savings, and may
implement their investments using these as close safe asset substitutes for cash.
15. By construction, the estimated values in column 2 of Table 6 are the same as those in column 2 of Table 5, except
that the signs are reversed.97
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Table 5  Decisions on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Broad Asset Groups
(Logistic Model), Estimation Results (Cash/Total Financial Assets)
Cash, Cash, Cash, deposits,
Dependent variable = cash/total financial assets Cash and deposits, deposits, stocks and With
deposits and and stocks  bonds, and restrictions
insurances and bonds insurances
2001 dummy –0.054 –0.018 0.025 0.183*** –0.006
2002 dummy –0.041 –0.123*** 0.228** 0.045  –0.081***
Cash and deposits adjustment term –0.167** 0.168 –1.219** –0.503** 0.090***
Cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds adjustment term –0.548 0.092 1.020** 2.010*** –0.001
Cash, deposits, and insurances adjustment term 1.507** –0.383 –0.308** –2.931*** 0.000
Cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances adjustment term –0.620** 0.071 0.360 0.185** –0.067***
Total assets (logarithm) –0.802*** –0.746*** –0.365** –0.509*** –0.756***
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.368*** 0.096** –0.184** –0.074** 0.131***
Concerned 0.450*** 0.042 0.443*** –0.153** 0.105***
Worried –0.005 –0.031 0.124** 0.029 –0.025**
Yield-emphasis 0.006 0.168** –0.577** –0.612*** 0.074**
Safety-emphasis –0.239** 0.133** –0.517** –0.383*** 0.003 
Liquidity-emphasis –0.169** 0.198** –0.431** –0.238** 0.049 
Risk-acceptor 0.246** 0.028 –0.238** –0.267*** –0.027
Risk-avoider –0.241*** –0.092** –0.130** 0.077** –0.114***
Known 0.172** –0.026 –0.233** –0.211*** –0.008 
High-yield shift 0.222** –0.176** –0.089 –0.142** 0.043**
Term shift 0.228** 0.149** –0.184** –0.004 0.088***
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.351*** 0.473*** 0.687*** 0.654*** 0.489***
Cash investment for safety 0.765*** 0.503*** 1.176*** 0.546*** 0.691***
Has borrowings 0.007** 0.001 0.007** –0.013** 0.004**
Number of household members –0.004 0.030** 0.102*** 0.074*** 0.021***
Head of household in 30s –0.228** –0.016 0.171 0.437*** 0.012
Head of household in 40s –0.201** 0.140** 0.678*** 0.694*** 0.068
Head of household in 50s 0.036 0.413*** 0.679*** 0.726*** 0.316***
Head of household 60–64 0.061 0.445*** 0.233 0.752*** 0.353***
Head of household 65–69 0.169 0.412** 0.354** 0.821*** 0.363***
Head of household 70 or over 0.086 0.386** 0.185 0.607*** 0.366***
Self-employed 0.079 0.125** 0.729*** 0.512*** 0.194***
Homeowner –0.053 0.033 0.059 0.000 –0.002
Unemployed –0.102** 0.193*** –0.292** –0.191*** 0.017
Only head of household employed 0.042 0.053 –0.107 –0.045 0.031
Spouse also employed 0.096** 0.091** –0.372*** 0.002 0.027
Hokkaido 0.457*** –0.258*** 0.045 0.085 –0.008
Tohoku 0.130** –0.113** 0.122 –0.085 0.004
Kanto 0.439*** 0.001 0.233** –0.091** 0.128***
Hokuriku 0.510*** –0.310*** –0.059 –0.139** –0.030
Chubu 0.333*** –0.124** 0.158 –0.172** 0.016
Kinki 0.496*** –0.003 0.178 –0.298*** 0.128***
Shikoku 0.612*** –0.267** –0.139 –0.395*** 0.016
Kyushu 0.257** –0.106** 0.384** –0.026 0.048**
City scale 2 –0.189** 0.076** –0.009 0.132** 0.006
City scale 3 –0.203** –0.083** –0.222** 0.180*** –0.051**
City scale 4 –0.329*** 0.041 0.005 0.208*** –0.011
City scale 5 –0.029 –0.044 0.140 –0.380** –0.173**
City scale 6 –0.219** –0.038 0.041 0.277*** –0.052**
Constant –0.759** –0.269 0.256 –0.835 –0.212**
Number of samples 1,378 2,835 574 2,151 6,938
Note: *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restric-
tions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the logistic transformation on the original values
before the transformation was 0.03. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.03 times to evaluate the marginal effects
from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic transformation in terms
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Table 6  Decisions on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Broad Asset Groups
(Logistic Model), Estimation Results (Deposits/Total Financial Assets)
Cash, Cash, Cash, deposits,
Dependent variable = deposits/total financial assets Cash and deposits, deposits, stocks and With
deposits and and  stocks  bonds, and restrictions
insurances and bonds insurances
2001 dummy 0.054 –0.177*** –0.159** 0.012 –0.127***
2002 dummy 0.041 –0.079** –0.070 –0.032 –0.182***
Cash and deposits adjustment term 0.167** –0.625** 0.115 –0.635** 1.264***
Cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds adjustment term 0.548 –0.041 1.988** 2.746*** –0.525***
Cash, deposits, and insurances adjustment term –1.507** 0.506 –0.592** –0.065 –0.156***
Cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances adjustment term 0.620** 1.408*** –0.531 –0.510*** –0.836***
Total assets (logarithm) 0.802*** 0.681*** 0.095 –0.147** –0.158***
Expenditures (logarithm) –0.368*** 0.224*** –0.346** –0.347*** –0.100***
Concerned –0.450*** 0.276*** –0.665*** –0.293*** –0.259***
Worried 0.005 0.008 0.169** 0.060** 0.054**
Yield-emphasis –0.006 0.006 –0.557** –0.503*** 0.368***
Safety-emphasis 0.239** –0.174** 0.290 0.004 0.551***
Liquidity-emphasis 0.169** –0.429*** 0.156 0.023 0.431***
Risk-acceptor –0.246** 0.179** –0.605*** –0.445*** –0.357***
Risk-avoider 0.241*** –0.052 0.367*** 0.365*** 0.195***
Known –0.172** 0.263*** –0.084 –0.144*** 0.013
High-yield shift –0.222** 0.282*** –0.670*** –0.321*** –0.095***
Term shift –0.228** 0.307*** –0.085 –0.126** 0.009
Cash investment because of low interest rates –0.351*** –0.207*** –0.143 –0.080** –0.249***
Cash investment for safety –0.765*** –0.243** –0.503** 0.228** –0.002
Has borrowings –0.007** 0.011** –0.036*** –0.035*** –0.009***
Number of household members 0.004 –0.064*** 0.036 0.006 –0.092***
Head of household in 30s 0.228** –0.533*** –0.397** –0.360** –0.200***
Head of household in 40s 0.201** –0.893*** –0.335 –0.550*** –0.568***
Head of household in 50s –0.036 –0.949*** –0.122 –0.251** –0.287***
Head of household 60–64 –0.061 –0.926*** –0.056 –0.064 0.093**
Head of household 65–69 –0.169 –0.910*** 0.019 –0.118 0.027
Head of household 70 or over –0.086 –0.663*** –0.694** –0.016 0.360***
Self-employed –0.079 –0.365*** 0.624** 0.407*** –0.074**
Homeowner 0.053 0.018 0.165** 0.105** 0.043**
Unemployed 0.102** 0.015 –0.032 –0.099** 0.090**
Only head of household employed –0.042 0.118** –0.473*** –0.292*** –0.086***
Spouse also employed –0.096** –0.115** –0.138** –0.170*** –0.110***
Hokkaido –0.457*** –0.280*** –0.396** 0.186** –0.087**
Tohoku –0.130** –0.143** –0.522** –0.134** –0.011
Kanto –0.439*** 0.077** –0.592*** –0.145** –0.025
Hokuriku –0.510*** –0.051 –0.285** –0.203** –0.121**
Chubu –0.333*** 0.154** –0.572*** –0.026 0.026
Kinki –0.496*** –0.078 –0.638** –0.213** –0.051**
Shikoku –0.612*** –0.124 –0.839*** –0.251** 0.022
Kyushu –0.257** –0.046 –0.148 –0.004 –0.004
City scale 2 0.189** 0.055 0.297** 0.001 0.130***
City scale 3 0.203** –0.065 0.310** 0.150** 0.210***
City scale 4 0.329*** 0.040 0.569*** 0.181** 0.360***
City scale 5 0.029 –0.046 0.607** 0.736*** 0.157**
City scale 6 0.219** 0.077 0.475** 0.216*** 0.156***
Constant 0.759** –3.980*** 4.966** 5.181*** 2.251***
Number of samples 1,378 2,699 533 2,099 6,709
Note: *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restric-
tions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the logistic transformation on the original values
before the transformation was 0.12. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.12 times to evaluate the marginal effects
from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic transformation in terms
of the average changes at the margin.savings deposits due to heightened concern for the soundness of private financial
institutions. Accordingly, among those households selecting the product combina-
tions “cash and deposits,” “cash, deposits, and stocks and bonds,” “cash, deposits, and
insurances” and “cash, deposits, stocks and bonds, and insurances,” we conduct a 
second-stage analysis. That is, we analyze how the demand is determined among the
deposits subgroups, namely, bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings
current deposits, and postal savings time deposits.
There are 15 possible combinations of those four types of deposit subgroups.
16
We adopt those households holding all four deposit subgroups as the benchmark
households, and then use a multinomial logit model to determine the characteristics 
of the households with the remaining 14 combinations in comparison with the 
benchmark households. The findings are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Tables 9 and 10
report the marginal effect, that is, the amount by which the probability that a given
deposit combination is selected changes when an explanatory variable on the right 
side of the equation changes marginally by one unit. A total of 15 kinds of results 
are reported, because the marginal effect calculations can also be conducted for the
benchmark group. The method used to calculate the standard error is the same as 
that in Table 3. 
Finally, Table 11 calculates the sum of the marginal effects for several patterns. To
begin with, by aggregating the marginal effects on the probability of combinations
including bank current deposits, the second column calculates the marginal effect of
each explanatory variable on the probability of holding bank current deposits (regard-
less of what other types of deposits are being held). Similar calculations are conducted
in columns 3 through 5 on bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and
postal savings time deposits, respectively. Column 6 aggregates the probability of 
adopting deposit combinations that include either bank current deposits or bank 
time deposits to estimate the marginal effect on the probability of holding bank
deposits of any type. In the same way, columns 7 through 9 calculate the probabilities
of holding postal savings deposits (of any type), current deposits, and time deposits.
In the following paragraphs, we focus on the effects of household characteristics,
and investigate the marginal effects and their sums in greater detail. We start with
some notable findings from Tables 9 and 10. 
First we consider the influence of the deposit switch and cash investment for safety
dummies. These variables are valuable information sources that indicate what kinds
of fund shifts are actually occurring under financial system anxiety. 
The deposit switch dummy is negative at the 1 percent significance level for 
households holding “bank current deposits and bank time deposits,” and negative at
the 10 percent significance level for households holding “bank current deposits, bank
time deposits, and postal savings current deposits,” but positive at the 1 percent 
significance level for households holding postal savings current deposits or “bank 
current deposits and postal savings time deposits.” As shown in Table 11, for the 
sum of the marginal effects, deposit switch is negative at the 5 percent significance 
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16. The number of holding combinations is 24 = 16, but households that do not hold any of the four types of
deposits are classified as “cash only” and are therefore automatically excluded from the analysis.100 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2006
Table 7  Selection of Product Combinations, for Deposit Subgroups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Estimation Results (1 of 2)
Postal Postal  Bank time Postal savings Bank current
savings savings Bank Bank  deposits  current deposits 
Asset holding combinations time current time current and postal  deposits and and postal 
deposits deposits deposits deposits savings time  postal savings savings time 
deposits time deposits deposits
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Total assets (logarithm) –1.235*** –1.750*** –1.299*** –1.636*** –0.444*** –0.992*** –0.824***
Expenditures (logarithm) –0.165 –0.391** –0.185 0.123 –0.391*** –0.472*** –0.322***
Concerned 0.225 0.049 0.745*** 0.416* 0.245 –0.343 –0.226
Worried –0.365** 0.134 –0.288** –0.282*** 0.101 –0.544*** 0.103
Yield-emphasis 0.602 0.358 0.393 0.503* 0.113 0.039 –0.063
Safety-emphasis 0.920** 0.420 0.309 0.003 0.292 0.238 –0.265
Liquidity-emphasis 0.696 0.176 0.274 0.200 0.088 0.204 –0.258
Risk-acceptor –0.261 –0.405 –0.105 –0.150 –0.251 –0.213 0.173
Risk-avoider –0.023 –0.446** –0.152 –0.374*** 0.004 0.300 0.328*
Known –0.169 –0.607*** 0.267* 0.144 0.165 0.214 0.054
Unknown 0.144 0.250 0.068 0.374** –0.172 0.658*** –0.241
High-yield shift –0.145 –0.196 –0.156 –0.078 –0.027 –0.001 –0.208
Term shift –0.632** –0.916** –0.496** –0.903*** –0.043 –0.626 –0.382*
Cash investment because of  –0.080 0.602* –0.464 0.066 –0.203 –0.327 –0.126 low interest rates
Deposit switch 0.243 0.680*** –0.171 0.030 0.014 –0.334 0.548***
Cash investment for safety 0.776* 0.405 0.573 0.764*** 0.212 0.442 0.060
Has borrowings –0.004 –0.001 0.014 0.002 –0.007 –0.181*** –0.022
Number of household members –0.006 –0.060 0.060 –0.079 0.144*** –0.081 –0.013
Head of household in 30s –1.532* –1.981*** –1.483* –1.952*** –1.379* –0.893 –1.775***
Head of household in 40s –1.576* –1.738** –1.446* –2.033*** –1.477* –1.377 –2.040***
Head of household in 50s –1.086 –1.645* –1.213 –1.510** –1.028 –0.384 –1.880***
Head of household 60–64 –0.548 –1.090 –0.859 –1.428* –1.083 –1.216 –1.902***
Head of household 65–69 –0.526 –1.392 –1.263 –1.425* –0.997 –0.618 –2.230***
Head of household 70 or over –0.663 –1.115 –1.158 –1.749*** –0.917 –0.414 –2.409***
Self-employed –0.703*** –0.089 0.275* –0.074 –0.011 –0.685** 0.070
Homeowner –0.236 –0.138 0.054 –0.323** 0.022 –0.034 –0.035
Unemployed 0.579*** 0.072 0.569*** 0.208 0.204 0.617* 0.303
Only head of household employed 0.276 0.116 0.189 0.087 0.262* 0.453 0.544***
Spouse also employed 0.567*** –0.157 0.616*** 0.313* 0.240 0.519* 0.359*
2002 dummy –0.410** –0.688*** –0.608*** –0.657*** –0.553*** –0.047 –0.373***
2001 dummy 0.202 –0.707*** 0.218 –0.361*** 0.340*** 0.480** 0.011
Hokkaido 0.450 0.228 –0.944*** 0.189 –0.186 0.978* 0.330
Tohoku 0.071 –0.081 –0.107 0.202 0.042 0.696 0.311
Kanto 0.341 –0.003 0.021 0.238 –0.100 0.448 0.400
Hokuriku –0.192 –0.604 –0.021 0.184 –0.305 –0.209 0.016
Chubu 0.271 –0.059 0.003 0.134 –0.109 0.989** 0.547*
Kinki 0.285 0.027 –0.126 0.017 –0.211 0.494 0.402
Shikoku –0.318 –0.305 0.090 0.334 0.033 0.081 0.658
Kyushu 0.714** 0.662* 0.309 0.524** –0.040 1.037** 0.305
City scale 2 0.163 –0.357 –0.009 –0.014 0.111 –0.063 0.179
City scale 3 0.209 –0.312 0.318 0.014 0.283 –0.915** 0.143
City scale 4–5 –0.044 –0.180 0.024 –0.055 –0.250 –0.241 –0.045
City scale 6 0.291 –0.485* 0.197 0.003 0.006 –0.254 0.028
Constant 7.157*** 13.070*** 8.744*** 10.791*** 5.261*** 6.876*** 7.324***
Note: Benchmark group holds all deposit subgroups bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings 
current deposits, and postal savings time deposits. Number of samples is 6,709. *, **, and ***show 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.101
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Table 8  Selection of Product Combinations, for Deposit Subgroups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Estimation Results (2 of 2)
Bank time Bank current Bank  Bank time Bank current Bank current Bank current
deposits and deposits and current  deposits, postal deposits, postal deposits, bank deposits, bank
Asset holding combinations postal postal  deposits savings current savings current time deposits, time deposits,
savings savings and deposits, and deposits, and and postal and postal
current current   bank time postal savings postal savings savings time savings current
deposits deposits deposits time deposits time deposits deposits deposits
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Total assets (logarithm) –0.905*** –1.052*** –0.851*** –0.165 –0.730*** –0.115** –0.583***
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.006 –0.031 0.205** –0.591*** –0.020 –0.023 –0.054
Concerned 0.000 0.344 0.668*** 0.105 0.231 0.227 0.343
Worried –0.431 0.061 –0.278*** –0.206 0.037 –0.067 –0.194
Yield-emphasis 0.388 0.378 0.485* –0.274 0.156 0.345 0.188
Safety-emphasis 0.776 –0.023 0.278 0.046 0.122 0.248 0.013
Liquidity-emphasis 1.146 0.199 0.692*** –0.182 –0.154 0.092 0.198
Risk-acceptor –1.498** –0.082 0.192 0.046 –0.517 –0.244 0.039
Risk-avoider –0.424* –0.253* 0.003 0.145 0.079 0.142 –0.205
Known 0.287 0.036 0.266*** 0.002 0.029 0.089 0.105
Unknown –0.379 0.144 0.148 0.277 0.213 0.097 –0.319
High-yield shift –0.237 –0.223 –0.070 0.248 0.043 0.141 –0.168
Term shift –1.439*** –0.815*** –0.330** –0.513 –0.051 –0.213 –0.367*
Cash investment because of  0.056 0.452** 0.083 –0.225 0.827*** –0.083 –0.077 low interest rates
Deposit switch 0.390 –0.063 –0.400*** 0.007 0.000 –0.021 –0.331*
Cash investment for safety 0.050 0.486 0.510* –0.101 –0.647 –0.130 0.233
Has borrowings –0.005 –0.002 –0.009 0.042* 0.007 0.004 –0.010
Number of household members –0.045 –0.011 –0.005 –0.067 0.005 0.089*** 0.016
Head of household in 30s –2.249** –1.634** –1.906*** –0.980 –1.029 –1.978*** –0.801
Head of household in 40s –2.114** –2.200*** –2.349*** –1.349 –1.870** –2.118*** –1.300
Head of household in 50s –2.056* –1.485* –1.814*** –0.532 –1.597* –1.719** –0.981
Head of household 60–64 –1.655 –1.597** –1.984*** –0.742 –1.440 –1.719** –0.845
Head of household 65–69 –1.544 –2.252*** –2.100*** –1.447 –2.189*** –1.885*** –1.049
Head of household 70 or over –1.349 –1.896*** –2.494*** –0.789 –1.982** –1.970*** –1.033
Self-employed –0.221 0.028 0.292** 0.007 –1.220*** 0.007 0.150
Homeowner 0.055 –0.434*** –0.035 –0.127 –0.080 0.091 –0.243
Unemployed 0.016 0.391* 0.401*** –0.014 –0.101 –0.073 0.001
Only head of household employed 0.096 0.302 0.094 –0.040 –0.179 0.246* 0.107
Spouse also employed 0.744** 0.276 0.274* –0.048 –0.079 0.313*** 0.346*
2002 dummy –0.432 –0.509*** –0.226* –0.569*** –0.177 –0.162 –0.026
2001 dummy 0.051 –0.358*** –0.070 –0.045 –0.003 0.233* 0.022
Hokkaido 1.674 0.088 –0.262 0.356 –0.115 0.022 –0.329
Tohoku 1.837* 0.181 0.315 0.935* 0.009 0.376 0.235
Kanto 1.589 0.010 0.323 0.608 0.085 0.344* –0.009
Hokuriku 1.210 –0.257 0.443 0.274 –0.076 –0.084 –0.658*
Chubu 2.189** 0.038 0.404* 0.640 –0.222 0.128 –0.058
Kinki 2.333*** –0.001 0.057 0.702 0.165 –0.071 –0.305
Shikoku 2.211* 0.130 0.277 1.161* –0.025 0.561* –0.070
Kyushu 2.143** 0.068 0.416* 1.193*** 0.209 0.260 –0.016
City scale 2 –0.365 0.111 0.222 –0.369 0.148 0.209 0.010
City scale 3 –0.839* –0.141 0.251 0.451 0.380 0.232 –0.005
City scale 4–5 –1.940*** –0.121 0.167 0.209 –0.011 –0.043 –0.285
City scale 6 –0.244 –0.110 0.083 –0.300 –0.023 0.030 0.199
Constant 3.147 8.138*** 5.055*** 3.274* 4.989*** 1.384 4.313***
Note: Benchmark group holds all deposit subgroups bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings 
current deposits, and postal savings time deposits. Number of samples is 6,709. *, **, and ***show 
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Table 9  Selection of Product Combinations, for Deposit Subgroups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Marginal Effects (1 of 2)
Marginal effects
Postal Postal  Bank time Postal savings Bank current
savings savings Bank Bank  deposits  current deposits  Asset holding combinations
time current time current and postal  deposits and and postal 
deposits deposits deposits deposits savings time  postal savings savings time 
deposits time deposits deposits
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Total assets (logarithm) –0.020*** –0.024*** –0.039*** –0.094*** 0.027*** –0.006 –0.006*
Expenditures (logarithm) –0.003 –0.007* –0.007 0.020*** –0.033*** –0.008 –0.012**
Concerned –0.002 –0.005 0.031*** 0.015 –0.002 –0.012 –0.023*
Worried –0.009 0.006 –0.012 –0.017* 0.022*** –0.009 0.010
Yield-emphasis 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.025 –0.015 –0.004 –0.015
Safety-emphasis 0.028* 0.006 0.009 –0.016 0.013 0.001 –0.020
Liquidity-emphasis 0.019 0.000 0.005 0.001 –0.011 0.000 –0.021
Risk-acceptor –0.005 –0.007 0.000 –0.004 –0.015 –0.002 0.014
Risk-avoider 0.001 –0.009** –0.007 –0.033*** 0.005 0.007 0.018**
Known –0.010 –0.016*** 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.003 –0.002
Unknown 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.031*** –0.025* 0.012 –0.015
High-yield shift –0.003 –0.003 –0.007 –0.003 0.003 0.001 –0.007
Term shift –0.010 –0.013 –0.008 –0.053*** 0.035*** –0.005 0.000
Cash investment because of  –0.003 0.014* –0.030* 0.006 –0.022 –0.007 –0.006 low interest rates
Deposit switch 0.010 0.016*** –0.009 0.006 0.005 –0.006 0.028***
Cash investment for safety 0.019 0.004 0.021 0.052*** –0.004 0.004 –0.009
Has borrowings 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 –0.004 –0.001
Number of household members –0.001 –0.002 0.003 –0.010*** 0.013*** –0.002 –0.001
Head of household in 30s –0.007 –0.015 –0.009 –0.060** –0.003 0.009 –0.020
Head of household in 40s –0.001 –0.004 0.007 –0.048* 0.008 0.004 –0.023
Head of household in 50s 0.004 –0.011 –0.002 –0.032 0.017 0.016 –0.033*
Head of household 60–64 0.023 0.002 0.020 –0.027 0.008 –0.001 –0.035*
Head of household 65–69 0.029 –0.002 0.004 –0.011 0.034 0.014 –0.044**
Head of household 70 or over 0.025 0.005 0.012 –0.040 0.045 0.019 –0.051**
Self-employed –0.025*** –0.001 0.020*** –0.004 0.002 –0.013 0.005
Homeowner –0.006 –0.001 0.009 –0.024** 0.011 0.001 0.002
Unemployed 0.014* –0.003 0.025* 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.005
Only head of household employed 0.004 –0.001 0.002 –0.007 0.011 0.006 0.018*
Spouse also employed 0.011 –0.010 0.023** 0.006 –0.002 0.005 0.005
2002 dummy –0.003 –0.009* –0.019** –0.034*** –0.025** 0.006 –0.003
2001 dummy 0.007 –0.017*** 0.013* –0.038*** 0.034*** 0.010 0.000
Hokkaido 0.017 0.006 –0.060*** 0.021 –0.018 0.020 0.017
Tohoku –0.005 –0.007 –0.020 0.000 –0.016 0.010 0.005
Kanto 0.006 –0.004 –0.010 0.007 –0.029* 0.006 0.011
Hokuriku –0.006 –0.013 0.001 0.022 –0.029 –0.004 0.002
Chubu 0.004 –0.005 –0.010 –0.002 –0.028 0.017 0.019
Kinki 0.009 0.000 –0.011 –0.003 –0.027 0.009 0.017
Shikoku –0.020 –0.012 –0.008 0.012 –0.019 –0.003 0.021
Kyushu 0.016 0.009 0.001 0.024 –0.035* 0.015 0.001
City scale 2 0.004 –0.010* –0.005 –0.008 0.005 –0.003 0.005
City scale 3 0.004 –0.010 0.014 –0.009 0.019 –0.021 0.002
City scale 4–5 0.001 –0.002 0.006 0.002 –0.018 –0.003 0.001
City scale 6 0.010 –0.012* 0.012 –0.001 –0.001 –0.006 0.001
Constant 0.076 0.185*** 0.236 0.572*** 0.017 0.036 0.106**
Note: Number of samples is 6,709. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
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Table 10  Selection of Product Combinations, for Deposit Subgroups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Marginal Effects (2 of 2)
Marginal effects
Bank Bank Bank Bank time Bank current  Bank current Bank current Bank current
time current current deposits, deposits, deposits, deposits, deposits, bank
Asset holding combinations
deposits deposits deposits postal savings postal savings bank time bank time time deposits,
and and and current current  deposits, deposits, postal savings
postal postal bank deposits, deposits,  and postal and postal current
savings savings time and postal and postal  savings savings deposits, and
current current deposits savings time savings time  time current postal savings
deposits deposits deposits deposits deposits deposits time deposits
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Total assets (logarithm) –0.003 –0.024*** –0.018*** 0.011*** –0.001 0.072*** 0.006 0.118***
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.001 0.003 0.033*** –0.010*** 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.013
Concerned –0.003 0.005 0.047*** –0.003 –0.001 –0.005 0.004 –0.045**
Worried –0.004 0.011 –0.020** –0.002 0.005 0.005 –0.005 0.018
Yield-emphasis 0.002 0.008 0.027 –0.011 –0.004 0.011 –0.004 –0.043
Safety-emphasis 0.008 –0.013 0.013 –0.002 –0.002 0.010 –0.008 –0.028
Liquidity-emphasis 0.013 0.000 0.059*** –0.007 –0.013 –0.012 0.000 –0.032
Risk-acceptor –0.018 0.002 0.036** 0.003 –0.015 –0.016 0.008 0.019
Risk-avoider –0.005 –0.014* 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.023** –0.009 0.008
Known 0.003 –0.004 0.021** –0.002 –0.002 0.000 0.001 –0.015
Unknown –0.006 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.004 –0.021* –0.011
High-yield shift –0.002 –0.011 –0.002 0.006 0.003 0.024* –0.006 0.009
Term shift –0.014 –0.029* 0.005 –0.003 0.012 0.020 0.000 0.063***
Cash investment because of low  0.001 0.030*** 0.009 –0.005 0.030*** –0.011 –0.005 –0.001 interest rates
Deposit switch 0.006 –0.002 –0.044*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.017* 0.005
Cash investment for safety –0.003 0.016 0.031 –0.007 –0.033* –0.047 –0.001 –0.042
Has borrowings 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Number of household members –0.001 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 0.000 0.009** 0.000 –0.003
Head of household in 30s –0.012 –0.019 –0.065* 0.007 0.012 –0.077* 0.030 0.228**
Head of household in 40s –0.007 –0.043** –0.093*** 0.004 –0.011 –0.069 0.014 0.263***
Head of household in 50s –0.011 –0.020 –0.073** 0.013 –0.015 –0.065 0.011 0.201*
Head of household 60–64 –0.006 –0.029 –0.097*** 0.008 –0.010 –0.069 0.017 0.196*
Head of household 65–69 –0.003 –0.062*** –0.092*** –0.003 –0.032 –0.070 0.015 0.222*
Head of household 70 or over 0.000 –0.037 –0.135*** 0.011 –0.023 –0.077* 0.017 0.227**
Self-employed –0.002 0.004 0.038*** 0.001 –0.044*** 0.005 0.010 0.005
Homeowner 0.002 –0.024*** 0.005 –0.001 0.000 0.021* –0.009 0.014
Unemployed –0.002 0.013 0.025 –0.004 –0.011 –0.033* –0.010 –0.032*
Only head of household employed –0.001 0.010 –0.007 –0.004 –0.012 0.011 –0.003 –0.027
Spouse also employed 0.006 0.001 0.002 –0.006 –0.012 0.007 0.005 –0.043***
2002 dummy –0.001 –0.013 0.011 –0.005 0.005 0.019* 0.016** 0.054***
2001 dummy 0.001 –0.025*** –0.010 –0.001 –0.001 0.027** 0.001 –0.002
Hokkaido 0.022 0.007 –0.029 0.007 –0.003 0.005 –0.017 0.003
Tohoku 0.021 –0.001 0.014 0.015 –0.007 0.022 0.002 –0.034
Kanto 0.019 –0.011 0.018 0.009 –0.003 0.021 –0.010 –0.029
Hokuriku 0.016 –0.015 0.056*** 0.006 –0.002 –0.006 –0.034* 0.005
Chubu 0.027 –0.008 0.030 0.010 –0.014 –0.003 –0.012 –0.026
Kinki 0.030* –0.003 0.002 0.013 0.004 –0.014 –0.019 –0.007
Shikoku 0.026 –0.006 0.007 0.019 –0.009 0.043 –0.016 –0.036
Kyushu 0.024 –0.015 0.015 0.018* –0.003 –0.004 –0.017 –0.049*
City scale 2 –0.006 0.003 0.018 –0.009 0.003 0.017 –0.003 –0.011
City scale 3 –0.012 –0.016 0.018 0.007 0.010 0.016 –0.006 –0.017
City scale 4–5 –0.024* –0.003 0.028* 0.006 0.002 0.004 –0.012 0.013
City scale 6 –0.003 –0.008 0.008 –0.006 –0.001 0.002 0.010 –0.003
Constant –0.026 0.203*** –0.005 –0.036 –0.004 –0.459*** –0.043 –0.860***
Note: Number of samples is 6,709. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
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Table 11  Selection of Product Combinations, for Deposit Subgroups (Multinomial
Logit Model), Estimation Results (Sum of the Marginal Effects)
Marginal effects
Bank Postal  Bank Bank time
Postal Postal current savings current deposits
Asset holding combinations Bank Bank savings savings deposits current  deposits and 
current time current time and deposits and and postal  postal
deposits deposits deposits deposits bank  postal savings savings
time savings time current  time
deposits deposits deposits deposits
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Total assets (logarithm) 0.054 0.175*** 0.077* 0.195*** 0.050 0.151* 0.032 0.142
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.068*** 0.005 –0.005 –0.044* 0.019 –0.046 0.043* –0.016
Concerned –0.003 0.024 –0.061* –0.094*** 0.019 –0.093* –0.027 –0.015
Worried 0.008 0.003 0.021 0.041* 0.013 0.049 –0.001 0.000
Yield-emphasis 0.005 –0.024 –0.054 –0.069 –0.011 –0.060 –0.006 –0.035
Safety-emphasis –0.064* 0.016 –0.037 0.001 –0.035 –0.006 –0.050 0.023
Liquidity-emphasis –0.018 0.014 –0.039 –0.078* –0.018 –0.065 –0.013 –0.001
Risk-acceptor 0.044 0.017 –0.010 –0.018 0.014 –0.032 0.020 0.009
Risk-avoider 0.004 0.026 –0.013 0.071*** 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.056
Known 0.003 0.026 –0.033** –0.021 0.023 –0.037 –0.010 0.015
Unknown 0.007 –0.046* –0.007 –0.023 –0.019 –0.041 0.022 –0.040
High-yield shift 0.006 0.024 –0.004 0.035 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.017
Term shift 0.017 0.099*** 0.011 0.112*** 0.027 0.056 –0.017 0.095
Cash investment because of low  0.052* –0.064** 0.058* –0.025 –0.004 0.015 0.056* –0.050 interest rates
Deposit switch –0.022 –0.053** 0.004 0.044 –0.020 0.047 –0.005 –0.020
Cash investment for safety –0.034 –0.052 –0.062 –0.119*** –0.027 –0.103* –0.036 –0.071
Has borrowings 0.002 0.003 –0.001 –0.001 0.003 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
Number of household members –0.009 0.018** –0.011* 0.014 0.005 0.009 –0.015** 0.013
Head of household in 30s 0.028 0.100 0.241*** 0.149 0.012 0.134 0.018 0.094
Head of household in 40s –0.011 0.127 0.219* 0.174 0.001 0.134 –0.015 0.095
Head of household in 50s –0.027 0.090 0.185* 0.138 –0.010 0.107 –0.019 0.063
Head of household 60–64 –0.053 0.078 0.177* 0.120 –0.023 0.104 –0.051 0.054
Head of household 65–69 –0.073 0.107 0.150 0.151 –0.042 0.099 –0.066 0.075
Head of household 70 or over –0.118 0.101 0.220* 0.177 –0.050 0.163 –0.083 0.072
Self-employed 0.019 0.078*** –0.041 –0.064* 0.039 –0.054 0.003 0.002
Homeowner –0.014 0.052*** –0.018 0.042** 0.006 0.010 –0.014 0.049
Unemployed –0.040 –0.030 –0.040 –0.049 –0.020 –0.051 –0.040 –0.012
Only head of household employed –0.018 –0.018 –0.032 0.008 –0.009 0.013 –0.017 –0.002
Spouse also employed –0.029 –0.007 –0.053** –0.034 –0.007 –0.031 –0.033 0.003
2002 dummy 0.056* 0.050* 0.053** 0.048* 0.006 0.042 0.047 0.055
2001 dummy –0.047** 0.063*** –0.035 0.074*** 0.000 0.034 –0.055* 0.079
Hokkaido 0.004 –0.085* 0.046 0.049 –0.043 0.067 0.060 –0.034
Tohoku 0.001 0.004 0.000 –0.010 0.001 0.006 0.041 0.007
Kanto 0.003 –0.011 –0.024 –0.008 –0.008 –0.015 0.032 0.008
Hokuriku 0.028 0.015 –0.040 –0.032 0.023 –0.078 0.034 0.006
Chubu –0.016 –0.012 –0.010 –0.020 –0.016 –0.018 0.033 0.015
Kinki –0.023 –0.034 0.027 0.005 –0.018 0.012 0.029 0.006
Shikoku 0.017 0.016 –0.036 –0.004 0.034 –0.011 0.047 0.006
Kyushu –0.048 –0.046 –0.017 –0.041 –0.040 –0.040 0.018 –0.017
City scale 2 0.024 0.006 –0.036* 0.011 0.009 –0.005 –0.003 0.015
City scale 3 –0.002 0.039 –0.064 0.021 0.026 –0.023 –0.037 0.034
City scale 4–5 0.036 0.002 –0.025 0.005 0.005 –0.037 0.011 0.004
City scale 6 0.006 0.018 –0.029 –0.005 0.007 –0.018 –0.021 0.021
Constant –0.489 –1.175*** –0.544* –1.123*** –0.298 –0.803 –0.329 –0.961
Note: Number of samples is 6,709. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.level only for bank time deposits. An interpretation is that, in many cases, “deposit
switching” actually means a shift from bank time deposits to postal savings. This 
interpretation is also supported by the simulation results that we examine later on. 
For the cash investment for safety dummy, Tables 9 and 10 indicate that it is 
positive for bank current deposits (at the 1 percent significance level) and is negative
for “bank current deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time
deposits” (at the 10 percent significance level). Table 11 shows that for the aggregated
marginal effects, cash investment for safety is negative for postal savings time deposits
(at the 1 percent significance level), and for “postal savings current deposits and
postal savings time deposits” (at the 10 percent significance level). Combined with
the above findings regarding deposit switching, this suggests that the households
increasing their cash investment for safety cannot think of any good safe investments
other than bank deposits and have chosen to shift their assets into cash. 
Next, consider the cash investment because of low interest rates dummy. As shown
in Tables 9 and 10, it is positive for postal savings current deposits (at the 10 percent
significance level), for “bank current deposits and postal savings current deposits” 
(at the 1 percent significance level), and for “bank current deposits, postal savings
current deposits, and postal savings time deposits” (at the 1 percent significance
level). On the other hand, this dummy is negative for bank time deposits (at the 10
percent significance level). These findings suggest that, overall, households increasing
cash investment for this reason tend to be those which hold current deposits, without
holding any bank time deposits. A similar tendency is observed from Table 11, where
we find that the cash investment because of low interest rates dummy is positive for
households holding bank current deposits or postal savings current deposits, or both. 
Third, reviewing the households whose responses indicated extremely high interest
in managerial conditions of financial institutions and financial system problems (the
households where the value of the concerned dummy is one), Tables 9 and 10 show that
when evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, they are highly likely to hold bank
time deposits or “bank current deposits and bank time deposits.” Conversely, at the 
5 percent significance level, there is a low probability that these concerned households
hold all the four types of deposits. This may be interpreted as suggesting that when
households are concerned about financial problems they gain more information and
consequently their psychological barriers regarding bank time deposits are dispelled.
However, the possibility that this indicates a reverse causal relationship, whereby those
households that hold bank time deposits which may no longer be protected after the
“payoff” (the removal of blanket guarantee of deposits) are the households with the
greatest concern, cannot be denied. Moving on to Table 11, we find that households
with a concerned dummy value of one have a declining probability of holding postal
savings current deposits, postal savings time deposits, or both.
Fourth, reviewing the households which responded that they “even know about the
details” of the deposit insurance system (the households where the value of the known
dummy is one), Tables 9 and 10 show that at the 5 percent significance level there is a
high likelihood that these households hold “bank current deposits and bank time
deposits,” and that at the 1 percent significance level there is a low likelihood that these
households hold postal savings current deposits. Because knowledge of the “payoff” is
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ings may seem counterintuitive. However, if this variable is viewed, as it has been so far,
as a proxy variable for the extent of personal financial education, the findings become
easy to understand. That is, they may indicate a relationship whereby households
begin to consider holding products other than the bank current deposits and postal
savings as they gain a greater understanding of diverse financial products. From Table
11, we find that households with a known dummy value of one have a declining prob-
ability of holding postal savings current deposits at the 5 percent significance level.
However, as noted above, this correlation may indicate a reverse causal relationship. 
Finally, we consider the influence of the worried dummy using Tables 9 and 10.
Households which responded that they are “worried” about the financial conditions of
their private financial institutions have a declining probability of holding bank current
deposits (at the 10 percent significance level) or “bank current deposits and bank 
time deposits” (at the 5 percent significance level). These findings may be interpreted
as indicating that worried households refrain from saving at only private financial
institutions. When evaluated at the 1 percent significance level, the worried house-
holds show a high probability of holding “bank time deposits and postal savings time
deposits.” This may indicate that these households are addressing their concerns by
increasing the weight of their postal savings time deposits. Regarding this point, the
fifth column of Table 11 indicates that the worried households actually are increasing
their postal savings time deposits in various forms. 
D. Decision on the Amount of Asset Holding (Intensive Margin), 
for Deposit Subgroups 
Based on the multinomial logit model estimations in the previous section, we now 
analyze the decision-making whereby households, which have decided to hold 
some kind of deposits, determine the amounts of holding for each of the deposit 
subgroups that belong to the combination they have chosen from among the 15 
possible combinations.
In this analysis, which uses the OLS method, we take the total amount of deposits
as a given and calculate the component ratios for each deposit subgroup following 
equation (6). First, we estimate the demand functions for each deposit subgroup under
the 15 different deposit combinations. The simulation results presented later on are 
based on these estimation results. We conduct the analyses after a logistic transformation
of the ratios on the left-hand side of the equation to ensure that the predicted value of
the ratio of each type of deposit to the total amount of deposits in the simulation always
falls between zero and one. 
Table 12 presents the estimation results for the ratio of bank current deposits to
the total amount of deposits. The symbols  ××  on the top line of columns 2–8 in
Table 12 are a shorthand indicating whether or not the households hold ( ) or do
not hold (×) a particular type of deposit, presented in the order of bank current
deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time
deposits. For example, the results for those households that have selected the combi-
nation of bank current deposits and postal savings time deposits are reported in the
second column of the table. Out of the eight deposit combinations that include bank
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Table 12  Decision on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Deposit Subgroups
(Logistic Model), Estimation Results (Bank Current Deposits/Total Savings)
Dependent variable = bank   ××   × ×  ×     ××   ×     ×      With
current deposits/total savings  restriction
Adjustment term ×××  –10.904** 1.398 4.104 –4.928* –1.124 –0.676 –2.605 –3.321***
Adjustment term ×× × 2.541 1.259 6.412 0.090 –2.010 1.819 1.157 1.196*
Adjustment term ××   4.817 –0.882 4.060 3.882** 3.345 1.881 0.104 1.241
Adjustment term × ×× 3.352 2.282 –4.077 –0.554 –0.042 –8.465** 1.766 –0.243
Adjustment term × ×  3.338 3.173 –5.720 2.802 1.858 –1.660 –1.061 0.252
Adjustment term ×  × 2.329 –2.755 4.857 1.620 –0.657 –0.582 0.601 0.534
Adjustment term ×    –7.233 3.269 –0.662 1.423 –6.869** –9.766** 3.400 –1.008
Adjustment term  ××× 0.746 –4.406* 3.503 2.903 4.886** 2.669 –3.269* –0.050
Adjustment term  ××  0.402 –0.629 1.891 –4.582 4.477 –2.130 –2.247 0.281***
Adjustment term  × × –2.957 0.030 4.168 0.500 –3.519 11.626*** 2.421 0.632***
Adjustment term  ×   5.410 –0.934 1.684 –1.376 –1.433 –4.710 0.121 0.105**
Adjustment term   ×× –5.333 0.267 –5.680 1.735*** 2.373 2.534 1.684 0.309***
Adjustment term   ×  –1.724 –3.316 –17.868*** 5.643** 0.743 –1.400 2.845 –0.045
Adjustment term    × 8.330 –0.574 3.949 –11.544** –5.511 0.371 –5.054 0.219***
2001 dummy –0.054 0.130 –0.835 –0.265 0.140 0.683 –0.221 –0.294***
2002 dummy –0.030 0.521 –2.364*** –0.021 0.126 –1.267** –0.372 –0.098 
Total assets (logarithm) –0.331 0.587 –2.848*** 0.173 –0.011 0.290 0.420 –0.137*
Expenditures (logarithm) –0.277 –0.304 –0.084 0.641** 0.369 0.966* 0.196 0.163***
Concerned –0.270 –0.387 –0.672 0.664** –0.326 –0.198 0.232 0.035
Worried 0.152 0.090 –0.245 –0.035 0.127 0.425 0.089 0.026
Yield-emphasis 0.232 –0.352 –0.910 0.961*** –0.397 0.434 0.265 0.116
Safety-emphasis –0.410 0.115 –1.147 0.428 –0.525 –0.740 0.048 0.072
Liquidity-emphasis –0.221 –0.147 –1.221 0.903** –0.468 0.284 0.176 –0.264**
Risk-acceptor –0.260 0.203 –0.937 0.211 0.112 0.114 –0.133 –0.004
Risk-avoider –0.492 0.190 –0.883* 0.171 0.337 –0.575 0.029 0.044
Known 0.208 0.115 –0.722* 0.386** 0.071 –0.463* 0.011 –0.134**
Unknown –0.499 –0.276 0.785 0.897*** 0.327 0.133 0.327 0.059
High-yield shift –0.934** 0.161 –0.820* 0.403** –0.030 –0.234 0.160 –0.124**
Term shift 0.659 0.325 –0.518 0.101 0.546** –0.014 0.013 0.050
Cash investment because of low interest rates –0.589 0.241 2.795** 0.709* 0.123 1.505** 0.334 0.469***
Deposit switch for safety 0.074 –0.168 0.697 –0.802** 0.320 –0.233 –0.205 –0.131**
Cash investment for safety –0.263 0.137 1.052 0.153 0.089 0.640 –0.093 0.056
Has borrowings –0.021 0.019 0.012 0.001 –0.018 –0.058 0.043** 0.004
Number of household members 0.146 –0.028 –0.533** 0.082 –0.010 –0.227 0.049 –0.002
Head of household in 30s 0.680 1.308* 2.419 –1.545** –1.049 0.707 0.734 0.008
Head of household in 40s –0.055 1.115 1.309 –1.429** –0.229 –0.032 0.638 –0.283*
Head of household in 50s –0.563 1.291* 1.220 –0.594 –0.841 0.250 0.844 –0.156
Head of household 60–64 –0.223 1.467* 1.852 –1.420** –1.060 –0.199 0.625 –0.303*
Head of household 65–69 –0.207 1.433 1.613 –1.083 –0.415 –0.029 0.288 –0.381**
Head of household 70 or over –0.398 1.410 1.502 –1.527* –1.135 –0.186 0.639 –0.359*
Self-employed –0.433 –0.088 –2.784 0.351 0.118 0.278 0.170 0.106
Homeowner 0.443 0.281 –0.883 0.446* 0.467* –0.561 0.448** 0.090
Unemployed –0.983 –0.149 0.209 –0.045 0.247 –0.105 –0.056 –0.102
Only head of household employed –0.832 0.393 –0.307 0.000 0.107 –0.193 0.156 0.095
Spouse also employed –0.453 0.152 –0.496 –0.202 –0.033 –0.503 0.045 0.007
Hokkaido –0.223 –0.764 1.153 –0.313 0.107 0.554 0.162 –0.090
Tohoku 0.727 –0.125 –0.786 0.730* –0.116 –0.550 0.470 0.206
Kanto –0.420 –0.510 –0.726 0.731** 0.293 –0.555 0.404 0.066
Hokuriku –1.050 –1.177 –0.799 1.681** 0.674 0.310 0.625 0.018
Chubu –0.103 –0.267 –0.711 0.999** 0.432 –0.216 0.302 0.230*
Kinki –0.506 –0.106 0.916 0.385 –0.017 –0.536 0.232 –0.024
Shikoku 0.857 –0.663 –1.749 0.763 –0.014 –0.857 0.589 0.160
Kyushu –0.490 –0.329 0.415 0.637 0.078 –0.766 0.364 0.037
City scale 2 –0.080 –0.058 –0.966** 0.119 0.308* 0.089 0.049 –0.036
City scale 3 –0.311 0.161 –1.125* –0.203 –0.070 –1.342** 0.168 –0.211**
City scale 4–5 –1.127 –0.008 –1.490* 0.391 0.070 –0.620 0.333 –0.243**
City scale 6 –0.077 –0.071 –0.799 –0.655*** –0.138 –0.307 –0.216 –0.226***
Constant 2.226 –2.903 11.208 –9.450*** –3.543 –4.246 –7.350 –1.040
Number of samples 320 448 246 789 829 369 1,132 4,133 
Note: The notation “adjustment term  × ×” means the self-selection adjustment term indicating the product selection type in the order
bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits, and indicates whether or
not the households hold ( ) or do not hold (×) each particular asset. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restrictions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the
logistic transformation on the original values before the transformation was 0.10. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.10 times
to evaluate the marginal effects from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic
transformation in terms of the average changes at the margin.current deposits, for the subgroup which contains “bank current deposits only” the
ratio of bank current deposits to total deposits is one by definition, and thus this 
subgroup has to be excluded from the analysis. Accordingly, the findings for the
seven remaining subgroups are presented in columns 2–8. In this table, the top of
column 9 is marked “with restrictions,” and the results in this column correspond to
the estimation that restricts the parameters to be identical across the households
which chose any of the seven subgroups. 
The first column of Table 12 lists the explanatory variables used for the regression
analysis. Among these explanatory variables, the notation “adjustment term  × ×”
means the self-selection adjustment term that corresponds to a particular deposit
combination: again, they are in the order of bank current deposits, bank time
deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits, indicating
whether or not the households hold ( ) or do not hold (×) each type of deposit. 
Table 12 indicates that the self-selection adjustment term is statistically significant
in several cases, confirming the appropriateness of the analytical method adopted
here. However, we do not find an explanatory variable that is significant for every
single subgroup. 
Table 13 uses the same notation adopted in Table 12 to present the findings for
the ratio of bank time deposits to the total amount of deposits. Similarly, Table 14
uses the same notation adopted in Table 12 to present the findings for the ratio of
postal savings current deposits to the total amount of deposits. Finally, Table 15 uses
the same notation adopted in Table 12 to present the findings for the ratio of postal
savings time deposits to the total amount of deposits. In these tables as well, the self-
selection adjustment term is statistically significant in several cases, but none of the
individual explanatory variables is significant throughout the subgroups. In other
words, the influence of each explanatory variable varies depending on which other
types of deposits are held. 
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Table 13  Decision on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Deposit Subgroups
(Logistic Model), Estimation Results (Bank Time Deposits/Total Savings)
Dependent variable = bank time × ×  ×  ××       ××   ×     ×      With
deposits/total savings  restriction
Adjustment term ×××  2.694 –4.978 2.087 4.928* –0.008 1.633 0.493 1.056
Adjustment term ×× × –3.980 –4.711 8.208 –0.090 –1.139 –1.001 –0.506 –0.307
Adjustment term ××   –0.094 –10.703 –3.730 –3.882** –0.665 –3.052 3.446** –0.168
Adjustment term × ×× –3.038 3.115 –2.276 0.554 0.059 2.893 2.346 0.044
Adjustment term × ×  0.608 –6.531 –7.890 –2.802 1.007 –0.929 4.477 0.283***
Adjustment term ×  × 1.036 1.667 5.325 –1.620 1.667 4.924 –1.177 0.443***
Adjustment term ×    –4.749* 8.100 2.972 –1.423 1.075 2.955 2.379 0.082**
Adjustment term  ××× 0.029 6.523 0.433 –2.903 –0.278 –2.267 1.777 –0.284
Adjustment term  ××  0.261 21.391 –31.753*** 4.582 –0.502 3.807 –2.771 –0.181
Adjustment term  × × 4.450 –10.518 12.426 –0.500 –1.010 –14.936*** –0.900 –0.451
Adjustment term  ×   2.372 –24.341 5.662 1.376 –1.712 –3.427 –4.682** –0.989
Adjustment term   ×× –3.059 21.113 6.863 –1.735*** 0.675 8.893 –2.146 0.477***
Adjustment term   ×  1.130 10.540 –10.753 –5.643** –0.399 1.272 1.017 0.034
Adjustment term    × –0.198 –19.525 5.929 11.544** 2.978 –0.710 –4.703 0.102**
2001 dummy –0.045 0.520 –0.383 0.265 –0.135 0.298 –0.210 0.132*
2002 dummy 0.035 0.865 –1.486 0.021 0.122 1.082** 0.375 0.006
Total assets (logarithm) 0.795** 1.159 1.061 –0.173 –0.067 0.606 0.849*** 0.204***
Expenditures (logarithm) 0.067 1.176 0.291 –0.641** –0.136 0.361 –0.353 0.028
Concerned –0.276 0.358 1.564 –0.664** 0.459* 0.307 –0.163 0.179*
Worried 0.287 –1.402 –1.010 0.035 –0.370* –0.669* –0.063 –0.083
Yield-emphasis –0.247 –0.602 0.510 –0.961*** 0.466 0.248 –0.513* –0.166*
Safety-emphasis –0.270 –0.249 1.350 –0.428 0.530* 1.154* –0.187 0.005
Liquidity-emphasis –0.484 1.559 1.969 –0.903** 0.586* 1.247* –0.670** 0.129
Risk-acceptor –0.331 1.852 –0.988 –0.211 0.068 0.457 –0.226 0.110
Risk-avoider –0.109 0.837 –2.215** –0.171 –0.194 0.627 0.216 –0.036
Known –0.003 1.880 –1.323** –0.386** 0.102 0.594** –0.001 0.053
Unknown –0.040 –0.820 0.920 –0.897*** –0.360 –0.155 0.174 0.089*
High-yield shift –0.329 0.862 0.642 –0.403** 0.005 0.269 0.151 –0.057
Term shift 0.396 0.124 –1.558 –0.101 –0.051 0.425 0.195 0.025
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.485 –2.175 3.101** –0.709* –0.316 –1.520** –0.723** –0.192
Deposit switch for safety 0.061 0.818 –2.366*** 0.802** –0.291 –0.101 0.366 –0.029
Cash investment for safety –0.435 0.076 –1.910 –0.153 0.034 –0.095 –0.147 –0.115
Has borrowings –0.041* –0.022 0.171 –0.001 –0.007 0.023 0.011 –0.004
Number of household members 0.074 –0.268 –0.413 –0.082 0.051 0.107 0.061 0.019
Head of household in 30s 1.085 –3.839 4.186 1.545** –0.429 –1.567 4.001*** –0.069
Head of household in 40s 0.536 –1.390 3.164 1.429** –0.489 –0.141 4.871*** –0.021
Head of household in 50s 0.327 –3.053 4.759 0.594 –0.238 –1.202 4.991*** –0.015
Head of household 60–64 0.470 –2.928 5.388 1.420** –0.231 –0.732 4.950*** 0.124
Head of household 65–69 0.525 –1.436 3.642 1.083 0.026 0.070 5.462*** 0.199
Head of household 70 or over 0.762 –4.962 5.471 1.527* 0.018 –1.157 5.688*** 0.113
Self-employed –0.443 4.425 –0.396 –0.351 0.207 0.810 0.179 0.142
Homeowner –0.265 0.609 –2.243*** –0.446* –0.101 0.731* 0.210 –0.074
Unemployed –0.302 –1.125 –1.411 0.045 –0.009 0.393 –0.021 0.040
Only head of household employed 0.062 –0.490 –2.476** 0.000 0.021 0.124 –0.149 –0.055
Spouse also employed –0.055 1.066 –1.797 0.202 0.113 0.288 –0.192 0.036
Hokkaido 0.557 2.614 –1.233 0.313 –0.146 –0.250 0.277 0.078
Tohoku –0.182 3.028 0.357 –0.730* 0.065 1.019* –0.048 0.031
Kanto –0.375 4.199 –1.027 –0.731** 0.046 1.131* –0.312 –0.062
Hokuriku –0.315 6.448 0.896 –1.681** 0.015 1.736 –0.234 –0.011
Chubu –0.351 5.690 –1.293 –0.999** 0.246 1.329* –0.194 –0.012
Kinki –0.259 4.633 0.146 –0.385 0.026 1.312** –0.194 –0.066
Shikoku –0.730 6.972 –0.324 –0.763 –0.043 1.122 –0.290 –0.089
Kyushu –0.848** 2.696 1.916 –0.637 0.140 1.007 –0.119 –0.059
City scale 2 0.206 0.487 –1.603 –0.119 –0.190 –0.040 –0.127 0.065
City scale 3 –0.376 0.448 0.225 0.203 –0.189 0.606 –0.011 0.040
City scale 4–5 –0.398 –1.732 0.965 –0.391 –0.250 0.907 0.196 0.098
City scale 6 0.129 0.433 –1.047 0.655*** 0.135 0.420 0.038 0.185***
Constant –5.622* –18.042 –19.776 9.450*** 1.468 –7.201 –10.746** –2.172***
Number of samples 706 88 134 789 829 369 1,132 4,047
Note: The notation “adjustment term  × ×” means the self-selection adjustment term indicating the product selection type in the order
bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits, and indicates whether or
not the households hold ( ) or do not hold (×) each particular asset. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restrictions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the
logistic transformation on the original values before the transformation was 0.10. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.10 times
to evaluate the marginal effects from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic
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Table 14  Decision on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Deposit Subgroups (Logistic
Model), Estimation Results (Postal Savings Current Deposits/Total Savings)
Dependent variable = postal savings  ××   ×  ××      × ×  ×      ×      With
current deposits/total savings   restriction
Adjustment term ×××  –4.770 4.978 2.069 –1.398 6.182 –5.153 1.543 –0.431
Adjustment term ×× × 10.727 4.711 –2.439 –1.259 –2.259 0.616 –0.117 0.045
Adjustment term ××   4.977 10.703 4.449 0.882 –4.467 0.110 –3.687** 0.323***
Adjustment term × ×× –0.190 –3.115 –20.803** –2.282 0.971 7.097* –0.835 –0.865
Adjustment term × ×  6.136 6.531 –3.539 –3.173 1.591 –0.690 –1.568 –0.574
Adjustment term ×  × 7.629 –1.667 5.792 2.755 –9.388 –7.796* 3.446 0.129***
Adjustment term ×    0.565 –8.100 –0.208 –3.269 9.709* 14.452*** –2.076 –0.025
Adjustment term  ××× 5.601 –6.523 12.145 4.406* –0.428 –1.981 –2.774 0.547
Adjustment term  ××  –21.030 –21.391 21.952** 0.629 7.633 1.476 0.817 0.980
Adjustment term  × × –15.041 10.518 –15.454** –0.030 –6.042 6.270 1.209 0.448***
Adjustment term  ×   17.190 24.341 –14.663* 0.934 –0.129 9.079** 0.738 0.100**
Adjustment term   ×× –0.223 –21.113 21.089* –0.267 –5.940 –14.567** 4.927** –1.311
Adjustment term   ×  –11.671 –10.540 5.900 3.316 5.177 1.990 –0.458 0.831
Adjustment term    × –6.902 19.525 –25.224 0.574 –1.059 0.611 –0.467 –0.033
2001 dummy 0.777 –0.520 0.675 –0.130 –0.468 –1.120* –0.222 –0.307***
2002 dummy 0.782 –0.865 –0.801 –0.521 0.912 –0.193 –0.394 –0.194*
Total assets (logarithm) –1.838 –1.159 0.311 –0.587 0.781 –1.085* –0.760** –0.238*
Expenditures (logarithm) –1.780 –1.176 1.493 0.304 –1.121 –1.658** 0.309 –0.119
Concerned –1.531 –0.358 –1.638 0.387 –0.778 –0.030 0.283 –0.330**
Worried –1.793 1.402 –0.357 –0.090 0.442 0.582 –0.036 0.168**
Yield-emphasis 0.122 0.602 0.026 0.352 –0.541 –1.361** 0.576* 0.011
Safety-emphasis 1.817 0.249 –0.745 –0.115 0.106 –1.071* 0.348 –0.055
Liquidity-emphasis 1.048 –1.559 0.958 0.147 –1.169 –2.452*** 0.921*** –0.028
Risk-acceptor –1.625 –1.852 2.392** –0.203 0.521 –0.190 –0.025 –0.051
Risk-avoider 0.613 –0.837 1.811** –0.190 0.857* 0.052 –0.152 –0.057
Known 0.679 –1.880 0.300 –0.115 –0.233 –0.180 0.132 –0.101
Unknown 3.311 0.820 1.003 0.276 0.140 0.069 –0.012 –0.156*
High-yield shift 0.849 –0.862 0.017 –0.161 0.327 –0.424 –0.285* –0.090
Term shift –1.768 –0.124 0.515 –0.325 0.813 –0.967* –0.230 –0.018
Cash investment because of low interest rates –0.159 2.175 –0.642 –0.241 –0.949 0.163 0.362 0.244*
Deposit switch for safety –2.028 –0.818 1.490* 0.168 1.088 0.595 –0.156 0.280
Cash investment for safety –0.090 –0.076 1.836 –0.137 –0.180 –0.889 0.780** –0.010
Has borrowings –0.774 0.022 –0.130 –0.019 0.027 0.045 –0.006 –0.007
Number of household members –0.551 0.268 –0.482 0.028 0.074 0.063 –0.011 –0.390
Head of household in 30s 5.722 3.839 –2.401 –1.308* –0.045 0.686 –3.254** –0.359
Head of household in 40s 4.673 1.390 –0.276 –1.115 0.139 –0.326  –3.614** –0.390
Head of household in 50s 7.067 3.053 –0.710 –1.291* –0.086 0.837 –3.702*** –0.682**
Head of household 60–64 2.884 2.928 –3.337 –1.467* –0.190 0.627 –3.801*** –0.515
Head of household 65–69 8.950 1.436 –0.365 –1.433 –0.488 –1.368 –3.722*** –0.309
Head of household 70 or over 10.227 4.962 –3.404 –1.410 0.182 0.646 –4.001*** –0.053
Self-employed –4.893 –4.425 1.022 0.088 –0.169 –0.763 0.173 0.038
Homeowner 1.174 –0.609 1.411* –0.281 0.318 –0.175 0.231 –0.148
Unemployed –0.075 1.125 0.924 0.149 –0.724 –0.406 0.224 0.022
Only head of household employed –0.631 0.490 0.543 –0.393 –0.522 0.190 0.183 –0.031
Spouse also employed –0.404 –1.066 –0.425 –0.152 –0.454 0.208 0.301 0.285
Hokkaido 3.206 –2.614 4.995** 0.764 0.587 –0.644 –0.077 –0.023
Tohoku 2.153 –3.028 2.426 0.125 0.174 –0.751 0.225 0.022
Kanto 0.284 –4.199 3.846* 0.510 0.314 –0.693 0.289 –0.161
Hokuriku –1.202 –6.448 5.072* 1.177 –1.056 –2.924** 0.472 0.036
Chubu 2.831 –5.690 5.119** 0.267 –0.055 –1.470** 0.452 –0.002
Kinki 2.171 –4.633 3.451 0.106 –0.108 –1.365** 0.388 0.072
Shikoku 0.045 –6.972 4.536 0.663 0.315 0.370 0.034 –0.060
Kyushu 3.460 –2.696 2.738 0.329 0.133 –0.572 0.200 0.017
City scale 2 –1.546 –0.487 0.750 0.058 0.281 –0.397 0.267 0.000
City scale 3 –4.403 –0.448 –0.415 –0.161 1.789*** 0.779 0.143 –0.026
City scale 4–5 –1.784 1.732 2.107 0.008 0.899 –0.333 0.116 –0.058
City scale 6 –1.231 –0.433 –0.333 0.071 0.340 –0.533* 0.118 0.800
Constant –8.257 18.042 –12.233 2.903 –0.380 11.329* 5.077 0.000***
Number of samples 137 88 134 448 246 369 1,132 2,554 
Note: The notation “adjustment term  × ×” means the self-selection adjustment term indicating the product selection type in the order
bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits, and indicates whether or
not the households hold ( ) or do not hold (×) each particular asset. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restrictions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the
logistic transformation on the original values before the transformation was 0.10. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.10 times
to evaluate the marginal effects from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic
transformation in terms of the average changes at the margin.111
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Table 15  Decision on the Amount of Asset Holdings, for Deposit Subgroups (Logistic
Model), Estimation Results (Postal Savings Time Deposits/Total Savings)
Dependent variable = postal savings  ××   × ×  ×     ××   ×     ×       With
time deposits/total savings   restriction
Adjustment term ×××  4.770 –2.694 1.289 10.904** –9.470 –0.810 1.123 –0.531
Adjustment term ×× × –10.727 3.980 –7.150 –2.541 –3.602 3.676* 0.418 1.229
Adjustment term ××   –4.977 0.094 –0.484 –4.817 0.845 –3.379 –1.590 0.197***
Adjustment term × ×× 0.190 3.038 11.168 –3.352 4.177 0.713 –2.815 0.362
Adjustment term × ×  –6.136 –0.608 11.228 –3.338 2.309 –2.177 0.687 –0.003
Adjustment term ×  × –7.629 –1.036 –11.679* –2.329 1.451 –0.614 1.057 –0.524
Adjustment term ×    –0.565 4.749* –2.473 7.233 –5.893 4.231 –6.539*** –0.109**
Adjustment term  ××× –5.601 –0.029 –2.583 –0.746 –2.576 –2.947 1.887 1.663**
Adjustment term  ××  21.030 –0.261 22.136** –0.402 –5.555 –1.903 3.639 0.220***
Adjustment term  × × 15.041 –4.450 –6.039 2.957 0.674 3.733 –3.554 –1.214
Adjustment term  ×   –17.190 –2.372 3.478 –5.410 –1.604 2.977 1.688 –0.011
Adjustment term   ×× 0.223 3.059 –11.571 5.333 8.541 –4.682* –0.436 –1.055
Adjustment term   ×  11.671 –1.130 12.663 1.724 11.474* –0.033 –2.584 –0.205***
Adjustment term    × 6.902 0.198 –6.111 –8.330 –1.803 2.563 8.216* 0.316
2001 dummy –0.777 0.045 –0.590 0.054 1.082 –0.061 0.196 0.205***
2002 dummy –0.782 –0.035 1.993* 0.030 1.434* –0.217 0.417 0.058
Total assets (logarithm) 1.838 –0.795** –1.675 0.331 1.645 0.059 –1.138*** –0.374***
Expenditures (logarithm) 1.780 –0.067 –0.919 0.277 0.692 –0.300 –0.093 –0.178**
Concerned 1.531 0.276 –0.588 0.270 1.064 –0.291 –0.057 –0.166
Worried 1.793 –0.287 1.081 –0.152 –0.211 0.391* 0.024 0.069
Yield-emphasis –0.122 0.247 0.227 –0.232 1.225 –0.324 0.153 –0.176
Safety-emphasis –1.817 0.270 –0.439 0.410 0.732 –0.311 0.205 –0.072
Liquidity-emphasis –1.048 0.484 –2.121 0.221 1.760 –0.597 0.218 –0.261*
Risk-acceptor 1.625 0.331 0.130 0.260 0.491 –0.281 0.060 –0.063
Risk-avoider –0.613 0.109 2.142** 0.492 0.108 –0.108 –0.233 0.009 
Known –0.679 0.003 1.205** –0.208 0.833** –0.188 0.142 –0.002
Unknown –3.311 0.040 –0.267 0.499 –0.841 –0.064 –0.606** 0.120*
High-yield shift –0.849 0.329 –0.221 0.934** 0.446 0.036 –0.337** –0.168**
Term shift 1.768 –0.396 1.203 –0.659 –0.434 –0.393 –0.021 –0.267**
Cash investment because of low interest rates 0.159 –0.485 –2.687** 0.589 –2.025 0.288 –0.207 0.108
Deposit switch for safety 2.028 –0.061 1.851** –0.074 –1.265 0.191 –0.108 0.105
Cash investment for safety 0.090 0.435 0.819 0.263 –0.573 –0.167 0.511 –0.010
Has borrowings 0.774 0.041* –0.125 0.021 –0.035 0.030 –0.048** –0.020
Number of household members 0.551 –0.074 0.675 –0.146 0.401 –0.033 0.036 –0.114
Head of household in 30s –5.722 –1.085 –4.718* –0.680  –2.297 1.215* –2.537* 0.097
Head of household in 40s –4.673 –0.536 –4.675* 0.055 –1.593 0.706 –2.872* 0.128
Head of household in 50s –7.067 –0.327 –5.336* 0.563 –1.016 0.912 –2.923** 0.127
Head of household 60–64 –2.884 –0.470 –4.861 0.223 –1.712 1.205* –2.619* 0.159
Head of household 65–69 –8.950 –0.525 –4.993* 0.207 –1.143 0.313 –2.400* 0.192
Head of household 70 or over –10.227 –0.762 –5.482 0.398 –1.698 1.077 –2.838* –0.026
Self-employed 4.893 0.443 –0.611 0.433 2.848 –0.206 –0.127 –0.046
Homeowner –1.174 0.265 1.983*** –0.443 0.637 –0.229 –0.359* 0.098
Unemployed 0.075 0.302 1.248 0.983 0.450 –0.489 0.144 0.117
Only head of household employed 0.631 –0.062 2.423*** 0.832 0.734 –0.077 0.199 0.058
Spouse also employed 0.404 0.055 1.987* 0.453 0.894 –0.129 0.410 –0.092
Hokkaido –3.206 –0.557 –0.480 0.223 –1.334 –0.159 –0.549 –0.248**
Tohoku –2.153 0.182 –0.723 –0.727 0.678 –0.207 –0.518* –0.042
Kanto –0.284 0.375 0.340 0.420 0.428 –0.447 –0.314 –0.091
Hokuriku 1.202 0.315 –2.093 1.050 1.427 –0.948* –0.644 –0.143
Chubu –2.831 0.351 –0.400 0.103 0.782 –0.830** –0.327 –0.028
Kinki –2.171 0.259 –1.065 0.506 –0.630 –0.350 –0.483 –0.040
Shikoku –0.045 0.730 –0.479 –0.857 1.645 0.018 –0.450 –0.009
Kyushu –3.460 0.848** –1.988 0.490 –0.458 –0.633 –0.319 –0.050
City scale 2 1.546 –0.206 1.691 0.080 0.633 0.001 0.106 0.051
City scale 3 4.403 0.376 0.951 0.311 –0.297 0.338 –0.114 0.066
City scale 4–5 1.784 0.398 –1.176 1.127 0.598 0.109 –0.668** –0.020
City scale 6 1.231 –0.129 1.011 0.077 0.416 0.048 0.259 2.989***
Constant 8.257 5.622* 24.181* –2.226 –8.329 –0.266 12.397*** 0.000***
Number of samples 137 706 134 320 246 829 1,132 3,504
Note: The notation “adjustment term  × ×” means the self-selection adjustment term indicating the product selection type in the order
bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal savings time deposits, and indicates whether or
not the households hold ( ) or do not hold (×) each particular asset. *, **, and ***show significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent levels, respectively. In the analysis with restrictions, the average marginal effect exerted by the dependent variable after the
logistic transformation on the original values before the transformation was 0.10. Accordingly, the coefficient must be set at 0.10 times
to evaluate the marginal effects from the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation on the ratio before the logistic
transformation in terms of the average changes at the margin.V. Simulations
In Section IV, we conducted rigorous model analyses on household decisions on cash,
bank current deposits, bank time deposits, postal savings current deposits, and postal
savings time deposits. However, using only the results presented in Section IV it is 
difficult to infer the sizes of macroeconomic consequences, for example, the amount
by which total household sector cash demand rises because of heightened concern 
for the soundness of private financial institutions. In particular, these results do 
not indicate how much the fluctuations along the extensive margin contribute to 
the fluctuations in the amount of total demand, or show the contribution from the
fluctuations along the intensive margin.
Accordingly, we now attempt to clarify those kinds of aggregate numerical effects
using simulation analyses. Specifically, we estimate the influence on the total demand
for a financial product from greater effectiveness of personal financial education, from
concern for the soundness of private financial institutions, and from low interest rates,
and for cash to gauge the influence on the overall economy. The estimations use the
findings regarding the selection of product combination groups and amounts, and
regarding the selection of deposit subgroups and amounts, and the simulations are
conducted for each of them. 
A. Simulations for Broad Product Groups
Table 16 presents the simulation results regarding the decisions on cash and deposits.
This table considers the influence of the following four kinds of changes in the
dummy variables on the amount of cash as well as deposits outstanding. 
First, we consider what happens under a hypothetical situation where all house-
holds responded that they “even know about the details” of the deposit insurance 
system (i.e., when all households are given a value of one for this known dummy, as
opposed to the 26 percent of households that responded this way in the actual data).
Second, we consider what happens if all households responded to the question
regarding the soundness of their private financial institutions that they are “worried
because their financial condition might deteriorate and they could fail” (i.e., when 
all households are given the value of one for this worried dummy, as opposed to the
28 percent that actually gave this response). Third, we consider what happens if 
all households responded to the question regarding their savings actions under low
interest rate conditions that they “decided to hold on to cash temporarily, refraining
from investment in financial products” (i.e., when all households are given a value 
of one for this cash investment because of low interest rates dummy, as opposed to the
6 percent of households that actually gave this response). Fourth, we consider what
happens if all households responded to the question “what actions have you taken to
enhance the security of your financial assets (choose all that apply)” with the answer
“decided to hold on to cash” (i.e., when all households are given a value of one for
this cash investment for safety dummy, as opposed to the 4 percent of households 
that actually gave this response). 
In Table 16, the row marked “actual performance” presents the average amounts of
the cash and deposits holdings calculated from the actual data. The row marked “base
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demand predicted from the model estimated in the previous section. We take these 
as the benchmark and then conduct three counter-factual simulations. Under projec-
tion 1, we assume that the conditional demand functions are unchanged, and see what
happens to the amount of demand when only the probabilities of choosing various
asset combinations are changed (when changes are made only along the extensive 
margin). Under projection 2, the probabilities remain fixed and only the conditional
demand functions are changed (changes are made only along the intensive margin).
Finally, projection 3 presents the total changes when the probabilities and the con-
ditional demand functions are both changed. The number of observations was 
7,951, but because outliers were excluded from the calculations, Table 16 shows the
percentage deviation from the actual performance for the base projection calculated 
as the average of the predicted values for 7,945 households. 
The simulation for cash in the fourth column of Table 16 indicates, first, that if
knowledge regarding the deposit insurance system spreads, under projection 1 (if the
conditional demand is fixed), the cash demand will increase slightly from the changes
in the probabilities alone, that is, a shift to cash will occur. Under projection 2 (if the
probabilities are fixed) the cash demand will, on the contrary, decline. The former
effect is consistent with the view that the spread of knowledge regarding the deposit
insurance system causes awareness of the risks associated with bank time deposits,
resulting in a decline in deposits. The latter effect is consistent with the view that if
personal financial education is promoted then households are unlikely to leave their
assets idle in the form of cash. 
Note that the changes along the extensive and intensive margins have the opposite
signs. Such a fact cannot be uncovered when working solely with aggregated data. 
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Table 16  Simulation Results for Cash and Deposits (Decisions for Broad 
Asset Groups)
Results of variable change Cash Deposits 
Variable changed Actual performance (¥10,000) 32.8 789.9 
Base projection (¥10,000) 19.5 1,090.4 
Knowledge of  Divergence from  Projection 1 1.8 0.4
deposit insurance base projection  Projection 2 –4.0 0.6 
(percent) Projection 3 –3.3 0.8
Worry Divergence from  Projection 1 –1.4 –0.1
base projection  Projection 2 1.8 0.6
(percent) Projection 3 0.1 0.5
Cash investment  Divergence from Projection 1 2.5 –0.5
because of low base projection Projection 2 53.6 –2.3
interest rates (percent) Projection 3 54.1 –2.8
Cash investment Divergence from Projection 1 14.3 0.9
for safety base projection Projection 2 77.5 –0.2
(percent) Projection 3 97.7 0.1
Note: Base projection shows the predictive value using the model. Projection 1 shows the predictive
value when the conditional demand function is fixed and the holding probability is changed.
Projection 2 shows the predictive value when the holding probability is fixed and the conditional
demand function is changed. Projection 3 shows the predictive value when both the conditional
demand function and the holding probability are changed.Projection 3, which combines changes along the extensive and intensive margins,
indicates that on average the spread of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance 
system pushes down household cash holdings outstanding by 3.3 percent (¥6,400). In
other words, the effect along the intensive margin is the stronger of the two. According
to the POS implemented between June 27 and July 7, 2003, the average cash holdings
outstanding per household were ¥360,000, so this ¥6,400 decline would constitute, on
average, a decline in household cash holdings on the order of 1.8 percent. 
Incidentally, if we mechanically multiply this ¥360,000 per household by the
49,260,791 households in Japan (including single-person households) according to
the 2003 Basic Resident Register, the total amount of cash held by all households 
is estimated at approximately ¥17 trillion. According to the money stock statistics as 
of the end of June 2003, the total amount of cash currency in the entire economy 
was ¥68 trillion, so the household sector share of cash currency using the ¥17 trillion
estimates derived from the POS is about one-fourth. Therefore, if hypothetically 
the cash holdings outstanding of all economic entities other than households were 
constant, and using the money stock statistics for the cash currency base, the spread 
of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance system would be projected to result in a
macro decline in cash holdings of about 1.8/4 = 0.45 percent. Multiplying this amount
by the opportunity costs of alternative assets provides an estimate of the benefits from
the spread of personal financial education, in the sense that these opportunity costs
would be saved. 
Looking at the simulation for cash, conducted in this same manner, in Table 16,
first we note that while the influence from worry is small under projection 3 at just 
0.1 percent (an increase of about ¥200 per household or 0.01 percent using the money
stock statistics for the cash currency base), the predictions under projection 1 and 
projection 2 have opposite signs and thus partially cancel each other out. Next, 
we discover that the influences from cash investment because of low interest rates
(54.1 percent or an average of ¥106,000 per household under projection 3; a 7.4 percent
rise using the money stock statistics cash currency base) and from cash investment for
safety (97.7 percent, or an average of ¥191,000 per household under projection 3; 
a 13.2 percent rise using the money stock statistics cash currency base) promote a very
large increase in cash holdings.
17
In practical terms, it is difficult to believe that the cash preference of all households
in the entire economy would rise to such a great extent, so we view these estimations
as the maximum possible increase in liquidity demand from the household sector.
18
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17. Many respondents probably interpreted the nuance of these questions regarding cash holding as asking if they
have held back on investing a portion of their funds in financial products other than cash and held this for cash
holding instead. In fact, looking at the data, those households assigned a cash investment because of low interest
rates dummy value of one (718 households) hold ¥8.34 million in deposits, on average (compared with an average
of ¥6.44 million among those households with a dummy value of zero [10,811 households]), and those house-
holds assigned a cash investment for safety dummy value of one (436 households) hold ¥6.44 million in deposits,
on average (compared with an average of ¥6.56 million among those households with a dummy value of zero
[11,092 households]). Thus, it is not true that the households assigned dummy values of one for these questions
hold zero assets aside from cash. For this reason, even if we hypothetically assume that all households are assigned
values of one for both of these dummies, the predictive values for holdings of financial products aside from cash
do not necessarily become zero.
18. In a model with multiple equilibria in the spirit of, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the demand for cash
could change discontinuously when the economy shifts from an equilibrium without a bank run to an equilibriumThe simulation results for deposits, which are presented in column 5 of Table 16,
show an average increase per household of 0.8 percent (¥85,000) from the spread of
knowledge concerning the deposit insurance system (the known dummy), an average
increase per household of 0.5 percent (¥50,000) from worry, an average decrease 
per household of 2.8 percent (¥304,000) from cash investment because of low 
interest rates, and an average increase per household of 0.1 percent (¥9,000) from
cash investment for safety. 
These estimations reveal that cash investment because of low interest rates may
exert a large impact on deposit demand. Conversely, they show that even if house-
hold cash preference dramatically increased because of the cash investment for safety
factor, the total impact on overall deposits would not be all that great. These findings
also suggest that a funds shift from cash to deposits might occur if the formation of
expectations were reversed via expectations of rising interest rates among those house-
holds which have given up on investment in financial products under the low interest
rate environment and are boosting their cash preference for the time being. At the
same time, the findings indicate that if concern for the future eases and households
no longer feel a need to hold their assets in cash for safety, the funds might shift from
cash to financial products, but the households might choose financial products other
than deposits. This may suggest an increase in the holdings of stocks and bonds.
Regardless, we must be cautious in making any interpretations, since our findings 
on deposits include postal savings and do not quantify the influence on individual
financial products. 
The analyses so far have carefully examined changes along the extensive and
intensive margins as separate items, but one may argue that in actual policy decision-
making the only important thing is the total effect when these two are added
together. Nevertheless, note that the variables that exert a significant influence are
sometimes different between the two margins. Accordingly, the same policy aimed at
increasing the holdings of a particular kind of financial product may have different
effects depending on the initial conditions, such as the amount of that product held
by the households at the time such a policy is implemented. For example, in cases
where the product is held by almost no households at the initial point, there is a great
deal of room for the policymakers to exert influence at the extensive margin.
However, in cases where the product is already held by almost all households from
the beginning, policymakers should target those variables that are effective in moving
the asset demand along the intensive margin. Consequently, careful analyses that give
consideration to individual household characteristics and product distribution condi-
tions are required to implement a policy to encourage the holding of a particular
financial product.
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with a bank run. If the data used in this study only reflect the behavior of households in the equilibrium without 
a bank run, our cash simulation based on the changes in the worry dummy only captures the effects of concern 
for the soundness of private financial institutions in the equilibrium without a bank run. If the concern for the
soundness of private financial institutions affects very strongly the demand for cash in the equilibrium with a 
bank run, as documented by the surges in the demand for cash in Japan during the financial panic of 1927, the 
simulation in this paper might underestimate the effects. The same limitation applies to the simulation of the
deposit switch dummy. We thank Kunio Okina for suggesting this point. B. Simulations for Deposit Subgroups 
Next, we present the findings of similar simulations for deposit subgroups. Here, in
addition to the four types of simulations conducted above for the broad product
groups, we also examine the influence from thedeposit switch dummy assigned to those
households that responded to the question about actions taken to enhance the security
of financial assets with the answer “switched deposits to financial institutions believed
to be more financially sound and trustworthy” (the influence when all households are
given this deposit switch dummy, with a value of one, as opposed to the 13 percent that
actually gave this response). The analytical findings are summarized in Table 17. 
First, we find that, on average, the effect from the prevalence of knowledge regard-
ing deposit insurance decreases the demand for bank current deposits (by an average of
¥18,000 per household, which constitutes a decline of 1.1 percent from the benchmark
deposits outstanding) and increases the demand for bank time deposits (by an average
of ¥129,000 per household, which constitutes an increase of 4.2 percent from the
benchmark deposits outstanding).
19
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Table 17  Simulation Results for Bank Current Deposits, Bank Time Deposits, 
Postal Savings Current Deposits, and Postal Savings Time Deposits
(Decisions for Deposit Subgroups)
Bank Bank Postal Postal
Results of variable change current time savings savings
deposits deposits current time
deposits deposits
Variable changed Actual performance (¥10,000) 215.0 409.0 68.3 243.2
Base projection (¥10,000) 199.1 410.6 104.6 317.8
Knowledge of  Divergence from  Projection 1 –0.9 3.1 –5.6 –2.6
deposit insurance base projection  Projection 2 –0.1 1.0 0.3 1.0
(percent) Projection 3 –1.1 4.2 –5.6 –1.7
Worry Divergence from  Projection 1 –1.3 –2.5 2.5 2.7
base projection  Projection 2 4.4 –2.9 0.6 0.4
(percent) Projection 3 3.1 –5.1 2.9 2.9
Deposit switching  Divergence from Projection 1 –3.2 –6.9 6.4 7.2
base projection Projection 2 –2.2 1.9 2.2 –0.9
(percent) Projection 3 –4.8 –5.0 8.3 6.2
Cash investment  Divergence from Projection 1 3.7 –5.9 18.4 2.3
because of low base projection Projection 2 15.9 –10.4 7.9 –5.2
interest rates (percent) Projection 3 19.8 –16.5 21.4 –2.4
Cash investment Divergence from Projection 1 6.6 4.4 –14.8 –8.9
for safety base projection Projection 2 2.1 –4.1 31.5 11.1
(percent) Projection 3 9.1 0.2 12.4 1.6
Note: Base projection shows the predictive value using the model. Projection 1 shows the predictive
value when the conditional demand function is fixed and the holding probability is changed.
Projection 2 shows the predictive value when the holding probability is fixed and the conditional
demand function is changed. Projection 3 shows the predictive value when both the conditional
demand function and the holding probability are changed. 
19. We chose not to convert and evaluate these changes in household demand on a money stock statistics basis due 
to the large error involved, as follows. According to the 2003 POS, average household bank current deposits 
outstanding are ¥2.39 million (with a holding probability of 76.7 percent). Simply multiplying this figure by 
the number of households results in estimated bank current deposits for the entire household sector of about 
¥69 trillion, which covers about 42 percent of the bank current deposits held by individuals according to theThese findings show that the spread of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance
system may increase bank deposits by promoting understanding of deposit insurance
more than it reduces bank time deposits from greater recognition of the associated risks. 
Table 17 presents in detail the predicted change in household bank current
deposits from the spread of information regarding the deposit insurance system.
Under projection 1, which shows the influence via the extensive margin, average
household bank current deposits decline by 0.9 percent (from ¥1.991 million to
¥1.973 million). Figure 3 plots the results for each household. This figure shows that
for most households, by far, the divergence from the base projection (shown by the
scale on the vertical axis) is negative. 
Under projection 2, which shows the influence via the intensive margin, the average
bank current deposits remain essentially unchanged (declining by 0.1 percent, from
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money stock statistics for the same period. Similarly, according to the 2003 POS average household bank 
time deposits outstanding are ¥3.82 million (with a holding probability of 52.8 percent). Simply multiplying 
this by the number of households results in estimated bank time deposits for the entire household sector of 
about ¥76 trillion, which covers about 30 percent of the bank time deposits held by individuals according to 
the money stock statistics for the same period. Together with the household cash holding amounts estimated in
the previous chapter based on the 2003 POS, the amount of M2+CDs believed to be held by individuals
becomes ¥164 trillion, which covers about 38 percent of all M2+CDs for that same period. The reasons for the
differentials among these estimates include the fact that under the money stock statistics, individual deposits of a
business nature are considered as individual deposits as long as they are held in the individual’s name; the sample
representativeness of the POS; and the various definitions of savings.
Figure 3  Simulation on Bank Current Deposits: Influence from the Spread of
Knowledge Regarding the Deposit Insurance System on Bank Current
Deposits (Divergence between Projection 1 and the Base Projection)













0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000¥1.991 million to ¥1.988 million). Figure 4 plots the results for each household. 
This figure shows that while the average effect is nearly zero, there is substantial 
difference among households, with some showing increases and others showing
declines. While many households show a positive differential versus the base projec-
tion, this is offset by a smaller number of households that have a greater negative 
differential versus the base projection, rendering the overall effect near zero. The figure
reveals substantial qualitative differences in the household reaction compared with 
the plot in Figure 3. 
Under projection 3, which combines the predicted changes along the extensive
margin with those along the intensive margin, average household bank current
deposits decline by 0.1 percent (from ¥1.991 million to ¥1.970 million). Figure 5 plots
the results for each household, and this diagram is similar to Figure 3, which plots the
changes along the extensive margin. This result indicates that the effect at the extensive
margin, which could not be analyzed with macro data, is quantitatively important.
Changing the worry dummy increases bank current deposits (by 3.1 percent com-
pared with the benchmark), decreases bank time deposits (by 5.1 percent compared
with the benchmark), and increases postal savings current deposits and postal savings
time deposits (both by 2.9 percent compared with the benchmark). 
Changing the deposit switch dummy decreases bank current deposits and bank time
deposits (by 4.8 percent and 5.0 percent compared with the benchmark, respectively)
and increases postal savings current deposits and postal savings time deposits (by 
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Figure 4  Simulation on Bank Current Deposits: Influence from the Spread of
Knowledge Regarding the Deposit Insurance System on Bank Current
Deposits (Divergence between Projection 2 and the Base Projection)













0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,0008.3 percent and 6.2 percent compared with the benchmark, respectively). These 
findings indicate that for many households, the financial institution which they trust
enough to switch their deposits is the post office. 
Changing the cash investment because of low interest rates dummy increases both
bank current deposits and postal savings current deposits (by 19.8 percent and 
21.4 percent compared with the benchmark, respectively), showing that liquid assets
increase when cash holding increases because of low interest rates. This indicates that
from the perspective of asset investment, bank current deposits and postal savings 
current deposits have a stronger complementary relationship with cash than time
deposits do, which can be a useful result for future research. While bank time deposits
and postal savings time deposits are both declining, the decline in the former 
(16.5 percent compared with the benchmark) is far greater than that in the latter 
(2.4 percent compared with the benchmark).
Changing the cash investment for safety dummy increases both bank current
deposits and postal savings current deposits (by 9.1 percent and 12.4 percent com-
pared with the benchmark, respectively), but results in almost no changes in time
deposits. In short, when households emphasize safety and increase cash holding, at
the same time as they increase cash holdings, they also increase their postal savings
current deposits, as well as their bank current deposits. 
For some of the simulation results presented so far, we are also interested in the
results of reverse simulations estimating what might occur if concern for the soundness
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Figure 5  Simulation on Bank Current Deposits: Influence from the Spread of
Knowledge Regarding the Deposit Insurance System on Bank Current
Deposits (Divergence between Projection 3 and the Base Projection)













0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000of private financial institutions diminished. To investigate this, we conduct reverse
simulations for the worry, deposit switch, cash investment because of low interest rates
and cash investment for safety dummies. 
Specifically, we examine the influences when the worry dummy (which has a value
of one for 28 percent of the households) is changed to zero for all households, when
the cash investment because of low interest rates dummy (which has a value of one 
for 6 percent of the households) is changed to zero for all households, when the 
cash investment for safety dummy (which has a value of one for 4 percent of the
households) is changed to zero for all households, and when the deposit switch
dummy (which has a value of one for 13 percent of the households) is changed to
zero for all households. 
The results of these reverse simulations are summarized in Table 18. In almost 
all cases, since fewer than 50 percent of the households begin with a dummy variable
value of one, the magnitude of the effects decreases in absolute values and the signs
are reversed.
C. Combined Simulations 
The simulations so far have been conducted separately for the decisions on broad
asset groups and on subgroups of deposits. Moreover, the latter simulations have
taken the total amount of deposits as a given and then projected the fluctuations
among each of the deposit items. However, it goes without saying that if changes to a
certain variable result in changes in the total amount of deposits, then the individual
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Table 18  Simulation Results for Bank Current Deposits, Bank Time Deposits, 
Postal Savings Current Deposits, and Postal Savings Time Deposits
(Decisions for Deposit Subgroups; Reverse Simulation)
Bank Bank Postal Postal
Results of variable change current time savings savings
deposits deposits current time
deposits deposits
Variable changed Actual performance (¥10,000) 215.0 409.0 68.3 243.2
Base projection (¥10,000) 390.3 491.8 104.6 445.9
Worry Divergence from  Projection 1 0.5 0.8 –1.0 –0.9
base projection  Projection 2 –1.6 0.9 –0.2 –0.1
(percent) Projection 3 –1.1 1.9 –1.2 –1.1
Deposit switching  Divergence from Projection 1 0.6 1.6 –1.2 –1.8
base projection Projection 2 0.5 –0.7 –0.6 0.3
(percent) Projection 3 1.3 0.9 –1.9 –1.5
Cash investment  Divergence from Projection 1 –0.4 0.5 –1.0 –0.2
because of low base projection Projection 2 –1.5 1.1 –0.6 0.5
interest rates (percent) Projection 3 –1.9 1.5 –2.0 0.3
Cash investment Divergence from Projection 1 –0.3 –0.2 0.7 0.4
for safety base projection Projection 2 –0.1 0.2 –1.3 –0.5
(percent) Projection 3 –0.4 0.0 –0.8 –0.1
Note: Base projection shows the predictive value using the model. Projection 1 shows the predictive
value when the conditional demand function is fixed and the holding probability is changed.
Projection 2 shows the predictive value when the holding probability is fixed and the conditional
demand function is changed. Projection 3 shows the predictive value when both the conditional
demand function and the holding probability are changed.deposit items will also be influenced by this. Thus, strictly speaking, the two 
decisions should be handled as if they are determined in a sequential manner. We
therefore seek to estimate the total effect on deposit items from change in a certain
variable by conducting a combined simulation of the two decisions, by taking into
consideration the predicted change in the total amount of deposits from the decision
on broad asset groups in conducting the simulation on individual deposit subgroups.
The results are summarized in Table 19. Here, the “actual performance” values are
lower than those presented in Table 17, simply because this analysis takes households
that do not hold deposits into consideration. 
In comparison with Table 17, the deviation between the base projection and the
actual performance in Table 19 is far greater. This is presumably because a nonlinear
transformation (logistic transformation) is conducted on the ratios at each stage. For
that reason, the findings here should be regarded as for the purpose of reference only.
Nevertheless, when the deviation from the base projection is evaluated for projection
3, we find that the results are almost the same as those under the above simulation
covering only the decision on individual deposit items. 
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Table 19  Combined Simulation Results for Bank Current Deposits, Bank Time
Deposits, Postal Savings Current Deposits, and Postal Savings Time
Deposits (When Decisions on Broad Asset Groups and Deposit Subgroups
Are Jointly Implemented)
Bank Bank Postal Postal
Results of variable change current time savings savings
deposits deposits current time
deposits deposits
Variable changed Actual performance (¥10,000) 181.5 345.3 57.7 205.3
Base projection (¥10,000) 233.9 488.9 117.7 360.0
Knowledge of  Divergence from  Projection 1 –0.6 3.3 –4.8 –2.1
deposit insurance base projection  Projection 2 0.3 1.6 1.4 2.0
(percent) Projection 3 –0.6 4.8 –4.1 –0.5
Worry Divergence from  Projection 1 –1.2 –2.3 1.7 2.4
base projection  Projection 2 5.2 –2.5 1.0 1.2
(percent) Projection 3 4.0 –4.5 2.5 3.3
Deposit switching  Divergence from Projection 1 –3.2 –6.2 5.6 7.0
base projection Projection 2 –2.2 2.1 2.0 –1.0
(percent) Projection 3 –4.9 –4.1 7.3 6.0
Cash investment  Divergence from Projection 1 2.9 –5.8 16.7 2.1
because of low base projection Projection 2 13.8 –13.0 5.9 –7.8
interest rates (percent) Projection 3 16.6 –18.9 17.4 –5.2
Cash investment Divergence from Projection 1 6.4 5.6 –14.0 –7.8
for safety base projection Projection 2 1.8 –4.1 33.5 11.7
(percent) Projection 3 7.8 0.7 15.0 3.0
Note: Base projection shows the predictive value using the model. Projection 1 shows the predictive
value when the conditional demand function is fixed and the holding probability is changed.
Projection 2 shows the predictive value when the holding probability is fixed and the conditional
demand function is changed. Projection 3 shows the predictive value when both the conditional
demand function and the holding probability are changed.VI. Conclusions
Thanks to the characteristics of our micro dataset, this paper has obtained many
quantitative conclusions regarding household cash and deposit demands that would
be difficult to learn from analyses using macroeconomic time-series data. 
First, we successfully demonstrated the importance of the extensive margin in
asset demand. For example, our simulation findings showed that for the decrease in
the demand for bank time deposits resulting from a heightened motivation for
deposit switching due to a stronger safety orientation, the extensive margin (deposit
withdrawals) is far more important than the intensive margin (Table 17). 
Second, we conducted detailed analyses regarding the causes of fluctuations in
cash demand, using individual household data.
Third, we took advantage of the many qualitative questions in the survey to 
successfully estimate the asset demand fluctuations distinguishing between fluctuations
in asset demand because of low interest rates and fluctuations in asset demand 
resulting from measures households take to increase the safety of their savings. It would
be difficult to make such distinctions using only macro data. 
These findings indicate that when the demand for cash rises because of low interest
rates, the demand for both bank current deposits and postal savings current deposits 
rises while the demand for bank time deposits declines and the demand for postal 
savings time deposits also declines slightly. On the other hand, the findings show that
when the demand for cash rises as a measure to enhance the safety of savings, the demand
for bank current deposits and postal savings current deposits rises simultaneously.
Fourth, we quantified the economic effects from promoting personal financial
education. We found that the survey question concerning knowledge of the deposit
insurance system can be viewed as a proxy variable for the extent of personal financial
education, and that changing the value of this variable has a great effect on overall
asset demand. 
When interpreting the findings presented in this paper, we must pay attention to
the limitations of the data used. For example, for the household characteristics, the
survey does not provide data on several variables that are controlled under conven-
tional research, such as educational attainment and the value of housing, land and
other real assets. Another important point to remember is that single-person house-
holds are excluded from the survey. The assumption of two-stage decision-making in
this paper also reflects the limitations of the data in terms of the size and the periods
over which the same questions are asked continuously. While we must remain aware
of these various limitations, future efforts to carefully apply the methods adopted in
this paper to aggregate individual household decisions should make it possible to
quantify the overall effect of personal financial education, that is, to quantify the 
policy effect. The kind of analyses we have pursued here should contribute to the 
further development of research in this field, which has primarily focused on the
aggregate asset demand function so far.
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